Assessing the impact of management and organizational factors on the risk of tanker grounding by Haugene, Benedikte, 1972-
Assessing the Impact of Management and Organizational
Factors on the Risk of Tanker Grounding
by
Benedikte Haugene
B.S. Ocean Engineering
Texas A&M University, 1996
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN ENGINEERING IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OCEAN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
FEBRUARY 1998
© 1998 Benedikte Haugene. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce
and to distribute publicly paper and electronic
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author: , epa of Ocean En
Depa of OceanEngineering
, (>--. /- December 30, 1997
Certified by:
/ Alan Brown
Professor of Naval Architecture
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by:
J. Kim Vandiver
Chairman, Committee for Graduate Students
Department of Ocean Engineering
9ii 2
Impact of Management and Organizational Factors on the Risk of Tanker Grounding
Assessing the Impact of Management and Organizational
Factors on the Risk of Tanker Grounding
by
Benedikte Haugene
Submitted to the Department of Ocean Engineering
on December 30, 1997 in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in
Ocean Systems Management
Abstract
Management and organizational factors have contributed either directly or indirectly in a number of
marine accidents. Unfortunately, these factors are still under-represented in both human reliability
analysis and probabilistic risk assessment. The International Safety Management Code, which is a
much needed instrument in focusing on management and organizational aspects of the maritime
industry, motivates the ship operator to identify the management factors that may increase risk and to
develop preventive and corrective measures for those factors. In order to successfully incorporate
effective and efficient measures to prevent accidents, a systematic approach must be utilized. The
overall objective of this thesis is to develop a probabilistic risk model for oil tanker groundings, which
includes the relationship between management, performance shaping factors, and individual errors.
The thesis quantitatively links management and organizational factors to the human errors and
equipment failures which are involved in oil tanker groundings. The analysis is based on a grounding
model, previously developed, which applies the risk assessment methodologies of the nuclear power
industry, utilizing fault/event trees and the technique for human error rate prediction data to quantify
individual errors. In this thesis, the model is taken one step further by examining performance shaping
factors, as well as management and organizational factors. This extension is significant considering the
number of management deficiencies contributing to accidents. The performance shaping factors and
the management and organizational factors are weighed utilizing expert opinion and the analytical
hierarchy process, in order to determine relative importance. Finally, management and organizational
factors, found to have the greatest impact on the probability of grounding, are compared to those
factors emphasized by the International Safety Management Code.
Thesis Supervisor: Alan Brown
Title: Professor of Naval Architecture
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1 Introduction
A number of highly visible oil spills in both US national and international waters have increased the
public's awareness of the dangers involved in transporting oil at sea. As a result, the marine industry
has come under substantial pressure to reduce the risks of such accidents. Traditionally, the risks
associated with oil tankers have been approached from a technical point of view. More recently the
need for focusing on the human and organizational factors involved in tanker operations has been
realized.
1.1 Motivation
Oil spills are classified as low probability/high consequence events [3]. That is, the probability of an
oil spill is considered relatively low; however, the consequences are in some cases extremely high,
resulting in significant overall risk. The potential consequences, including environmental, economic,
and health impacts, typically result in significant adverse public reactions.
Until the late 1980s, the attitude of the maritime industry was primarily reactive. The focus was on the
mitigation efforts following accidents to minimize the consequences of the oil spills. However, as a
result of problems and costs experienced with containment, removal, and treatment of oil spills, it has
been generally realized that the primary line of defense should be the prevention of accidents resulting
in oil spills. This view has been further strengthened after the March 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in
Prince William Sound, Alaska. Following this accident, in which the Exxon Valdez grounded on
Bligh Reef spilling approximately 238,000 BBL of Alaskan crude oil [26], the US enacted the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90) on August 18, 1990.
Under OPA-90, which applies to all owners, operators, and bareboat charterers of vessels that operate
in US waters, responsible parties are liable on a "joint and severally" basis for discharges of oil,
including oil spill containment and cleanup costs and other damages arising from the spill. The act
places a limit on the liabilities of the responsible parties; the greater of $1,200 per gross ton or $10
million per tanker [24]. However, this limit does not apply in the cases where the spill is caused by a
violation of US federal safety, construction, or operating regulations, gross negligence or willful
misconduct, or if the responsible party did not report the accident or assist with the oil removal. In
addition, there are no limits to the US state law liability [24]. As a result of the potential unlimited
liability, the tanker industry has become increasingly aware of the necessity of reducing the risk of oil
spills, as well as limiting all factors that may result in liability.
The possibility of experiencing an offshore or coastal oil spill is related to the amount of oil being
transported at sea. Nearly half of all seaborne trade consists of the transportation of petroleum
products, and oil tankers represent 38 percent of the world fleet by tonnage [60]. Tankers are the
largest contributor by vessel type to oil spill volume in the world. In the period from 1986 to 1994,
tanker spills accounted for 60 percent of all oil spilled from maritime sources [17]. Figure 1-1
illustrates oil spill volume by vessel type. Similarly, in 1993 the United Kingdom Protection and
Indemnity (UK P&I) Club reported that tankers were involved in half of their total pollution claims.
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3% -
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Figure 1-1: Maritime Oil Spill Volume by Vessel Service [17]
The primary causes of accidental oil spills are grounding, collision, explosion/fire, and structural
failure. The percentage of incidents and volume of oil spilled resulting from the different causes are
illustrated in Figure 1-2. Both with respect to the number of incidents and volume, groundings and
collisions together represent the largest contribution to oil spills. Grounding, which occurs in the event
that a tanker enters water in which the draft of the tanker exceeds the depth, is a significant cause of oil
spills [43]. For instance, in the period from 1987 to 1991, tanker groundings resulted in 20 percent of
the world's tanker losses [58], and in the period from 1981 to 1990, groundings resulted in 45 percent
of major spill volume in the US [36]. Due to the importance of and the frequency with which
grounding occurs, this thesis will focus on oil tanker groundings in order to evaluate tanker risk. (The
analysis of groundings differs primarily from collision analysis with respect to the number of vessels
involved; grounding involves only one vessel compared to collision which involves the dynamics of
two vessels.) By analyzing tanker groundings, the failures and errors which lead to groundings may be
identified and quantified, which enables tanker owners and operators to implement the necessary
corrective measures.
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Figure 1-2: Causes of Major Accidental Oil Spills by Tankers [43]
Tanker groundings are caused by structural failure, mechanical failure, equipment failure and/or human
error. Historically, the maritime community has approached safety and pollution prevention from a
predominantly technical perspective. Certainly, a variety of technical systems, including systems
related to propulsion, steering, anchor, electronic navigation, etc., are of great importance for the
operation of tankers. However, at the core of the majority of the accidents are management and
organizational factors. Management and organizational factors greatly influence both the technical and
the human elements involved in the design and operation of the vessel. The ability of the technical
systems to perform in a satisfactory manner depends on proper design, maintenance, and operation, all
of which are directly affected by the management of the tanker. Similarly, the crew operating the
tanker is greatly affected by policies, procedures, and decisions made by the management.
Recently, the necessity of addressing human and organizational factors affecting safety has been
realized. The International Safety Management (ISM) Code is a much needed instrument in focusing
on these factors in the maritime industry. The ISM Code requires vessel operators to develop and
implement a safety management system. In order to meet the requirements of the ISM Code, a ship
operator must identify those factors that involve the most risk and develop preventive or corrective
measures for those factors. Therefore, in the process of complying with the ISM Code, companies
have an opportunity to identify undesirable practices and improve their operations.
1.2 Approach
In order to successfully incorporate effective and efficient preventive and corrective measures for
failures resulting in tanker groundings, a systematic approach for evaluating the risks involved in the
tanker operation must be utilized. This thesis builds on a grounding model, developed in a previous
study [3], which estimates the probability of tanker grounding. The model employs the method of
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which is a method of identifying and quantifying problems and
hazards, as well as identifying areas with the greatest risk reducing potential. PRA includes the use of
fault trees and event trees, as well as the incorporation of Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
(THERP) data. The previous tanker grounding model is expanded to include Performance Shaping
Factors (PSFs) and Management and Organizational Factors (MOFs).
Grounding Structural/HullCollision Fire/Explosion
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The planning, piloting, and decision processes involved in grounding can be defined by a series of
standard tasks which are common to many processes. This assumption permits the application of the
THERP data assembled in the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear
Power Plant Applications [57]. The individual human errors are estimated using mean Human Error
Probabilities (HEPs). However, the HEPs are actually functions of MOFs, with PSFs as intermediate
variables. PSFs are factors that affect the ability of personnel to carry out different tasks without error
[57]. MOFs are factors that affect and in some instances define the conditions of the PSFs, as well as
the quality of maintenance and the condition of equipment. (The relationships between MOFs, PSFs,
and HEPs are illustrated in Figure 1-3.) By adjusting the HEPs with respect to the impact of MOFs,
the tanker grounding model also includes the influence on operations by management and the
organization.
P(Grounding) -- -2
Figure 1-3: Relationships Between MOFs, PSFs, HEPs, and the Probability of Grounding
The PSFs and MOFs are weighed using expert opinion and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), in
order to adjust the mean HEPs and determine their relative importance on the probability of grounding.
The final set of MOFs, having the greatest impact on the probability of grounding, is then compared to
the organizational factors explicitly and implicitly emphasized by the ISM Code.
1.3 Outline
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 introduces and discusses human factors involved in processes
and operations of tankers, while Chapter 3 focuses on the management and organizational aspects of
tanker operations, as well as grounding. Chapter 4 presents the ISM Code and discusses some of the
implications of this code. The risk assessment and the AHP utilized to estimate the probability of
grounding are outlined in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses the grounding model, while the specific PSFs
and MOFs adjusting each HEP are presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 presents the results of the
modified grounding model, sensitivity analyses, and a comparison of the MOFs, found to have the
greatest impact on tanker grounding, with the factors addressed by the ISM Code. The conclusions of
the analysis are presented in Chapter 9, accompanied by some recommendations concerning further
research.
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2 The Human Element
Human failure has a substantial impact on the reliability of complex systems, and it may occur in any
phase of design, construction, and operation. Various studies have determined that human errors cause
the majority of the accidents [17, 44]. Based on an analysis of 100 accidents at sea, it was found that
96 of these were preceded by human failure [25]. The United Kingdom P&I Club performed an
analysis of claims filed in 1993 in which it was discovered that human error was the primary cause of
63% of those accidents [17]. Figure 2-1 shows the apparent causes of the accidents.
Under Investigation Other
Structural Failure 5% 4% Deck Oflicer Error
12% 27%
Mechanical Failure
7%
Engineer Officer Error
Equipment Failure 4%
9%
Shore Error Pilot Error Crew Error
13% 6% 13%
Figure 2-1: Apparent Causes of Major Claims Filed with the UK P&I Club [17]
Due to the large number of accidents caused by human error, success in reducing operational risk in
shipping depends directly on measures to improve human performance [42]. Traditionally, human
errors have been classified as individual errors, which imply that those failures are part of human
nature. The result is that the high percentage of human error is accepted as the norm of the industry
[3], and rather than properly addressing the human element, the industry has focused on technological
improvements and punitive measures aimed at the operators. With the implementation of the ISM
Code this focus is changing. It has finally been realized that in order to reduce the risks associated with
tanker operations, it is necessary to identify and quantify human related failures, gain an understanding
of human behavior and reliability, and make improvements accordingly.
Accidents, which are defined as occurrences with negative and unintended consequences, are caused by
factors that are either internal or external to the system. Internal factors that result in accidents are
considered system failures. Even though some system failures are directly caused by human error, it is
the design of the system itself that is prone to errors [3]. The attitudes and practices of different groups
within the organization may faciliate the occurrence of human errors. The types of errors defined as
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general classes of organizational failures are discussed in the following chapter. The errors defined as
specific failures related to individuals are considered human errors.
Human beings are born with certain traits and abilities, while some are acquired through training and
experience. A person will act in a certain manner according to his/her personal characteristics and as a
result of the environment. In order to understand the environment in which a person functions, the
different levels of environment may be illustrated as follows [40]:
Figure 2-2: Environments Influencing Personnel
Figure 2-2 depicts generic factors and environments that influence a crew member's productivity and
reliability [40]. The influences and environments are modeled as an onion in which the different
environments represent different layers of the onion. Each layer may be described as follows [40]:
* Layer 0
General regulatory and economic environment
* Layer I
Environment/culture of the company or organization
* Layer II
Environment/culture of the tanker on which the person works
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* Layer III
Environment/culture of the company division in which the person works, i.e. teams and
units
* Layer IV
Physical and social environment in which the person lives and works
* Layer V
Personal characteristics of the specific person, i.e., knowledge, skills, abilities, motivation,
attitude, and morale
The outer influence is the general environment in which the person is existing and the company is
operating. This layer, which is not a true layer and therefore labeled Layer 0, consists of the regulatory
environment, the economic environment, and various relationships outside the company. The first
layer is the corporate environment or the organization, and it consists of the management structure and
the culture of the organization, as well as size, age, and efficiency. The second layer is the shipboard
environment, which includes the management style of the master, master/officer/crew relations,
technology levels, task definitions, procedures, rules, and standards. The third layer is the division
such as the bridge or deck division, and this layer consists of the management style within the division,
reward and punishment structures, communication within work units, inter-cooperation among work
units, and the availability of career paths. The fourth layer is the work area and teams that are the
workers' immediate physical, social, and technical environment. This layer concerns the level of
ergonomic or human factors engineering, effects of the physical environment and the social and
technical environment, on-the-job training quality and availability, structure of work teams, and the
overall professionalism of team and workers. Finally, the fifth layer is the individual worker, and it
involves the knowledge, skills, abilities, motivation, attitudes, and morale of the person. (Attitude and
morale are similar; however, attitude is considered a "state" variable, while morale is considered a
"trait" variable [40].)
The personnel are affected by all the different levels of environment illustrated by the concentric fields.
However, the layers closest to the center typically influence the personnel to a larger degree with
respect to daily operations. Each of the factors within the layers may influence more than one layer,
which results in dependencies among the parameters. Also, the different fields mutually interact but
nevertheless preserve the general identity at each level [40].
2.1 Human Behavior and Errors
As already discussed, human beings are the most risk-contributing constituent in the maritime activity,
and therefore the understanding of human behavior is critical to reduce risk. In order to achieve an
understanding of the behavior of human beings, this behavior may be characterized as skill-based, rule-
based, or knowledge-based [57]. These terms describe behavior as progressively more complex.
Skill-based behavior represents behavior which is almost automatic, rule-based behavior represents
behavior which requires a more conscious effort, while knowledge-based behavior requires even more
involvement by the person performing a task [57]. These terms are useful as a guidance to understand
the characteristics of the behavior of an individual; however, the distinction between the terms
sometimes becomes blurred and the terms may overlap.
Human errors are defined as actions that result in unacceptable consequences. A human error may be
caused by a person not having the sufficient skill or motivation, and/or some aspect of the situation or
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environment that induces an error. The term normally excludes malevolent behavior or deliberate
misactions, because this is not due to error but rather due to deliberate behavior meant to produce
negative effects [57]. Human errors are normally divided into the categories of intentional and
unintentional errors. An intentional error is an error which results when an operator intends to perform
an act that is incorrect, in the belief that it is correct or it represents a superior method. An
unintentional error results without any intended action.
Dependent on the type of task and the type of error, human errors are often divided into errors of
omission and errors of commission. Table 2-1 illustrates subsections of each of these groups [57].
The different processes involved in tanker operations may be divided into tasks of a series of different
steps, and the errors of omission concern the omission of either one or more steps in the task, or the
omission of the entire task. Errors of commission concern an error in selection, an error of sequence,
the performance of a step or task too early or too late, as well as quantitative errors in which the
performance is not adjusted correctly.
Table 2-1: Human Errors of Omission and Commission [57]
Errors of omission Omits step in task
Omits entire task
Errors of commission Selection error
Error of sequence
Time error (too early/too late)
Quantitative error (too little/too much)
As already mentioned, a human error may be caused by the individual or by some aspect of a situation
or the environment. Often, human errors have been concluded to be caused by an accident prone
person in order to justify inadequate safety procedures. The fact is that some groups of people are
more accident prone than others, such as male automobile-drivers under 25 years of age; however
accident prone people in professional/work situations are rare [57]. Normally, the people experiencing
a greater percentage of accidents than others are those who have the greatest exposure to situations
involving risks, or it is due to temporary conditions such as an illness, emotional distress, etc. [57].
2.2 Factors Influencing Behavior
A number of factors directly or indirectly influence human behavior. The PSFs, previously described
as performance shaping factors, represents factors that impact the personnel in a fairly direct manner.
MOFs, previously defined as management and organizational factors, represents factors that impact the
PSFs directly, and in this way impact the personnel more indirectly. In order to analyze the human
errors influencing tanker risk, the factors having the most effect on performance must be considered.
Factors influencing the performance of personnel may be classified as either internal or external [57].
Internal factors consist of the personal attributes; the internal factors determine the potential level to
which an individual is able to develop. Internal factors include personality and intelligent variables,
emotional state, expectations, physical attributes and potential, tolerance to stress, etc. External factors
concern the situation and environment in which the personnel lives and works. These factors include
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the physical, technical, and social environment, procedures, policies, and standards of the company,
instructions, actual and perceived task requirements, etc. Appendix I includes a list of internal and
external PSFs identified by NUREG 1278 [57]. In order to achieve optimum level of performance,
there should be a match between the internal and the external factors. The relationship between
internal and external factors is illustrated in Figure 2-3.
Figure 2-3: Relationship between Internal and External Factors Impacting Performance [57
Figure 2-3 illustrates how a mismatch of internal and external factors may result in disruptive stress
and therefore nonoptimal performance. Disruptive stress is associated with situations in which
individuals feel threatened, worried, angry, and/or uncertain. The degree to which these feelings are
experienced depends on the individual characteristics of the person, as well as the situation. A good
match of internal and external factors is likely to result in facilitative stress, which alerts, thrills, and
makes a person eager to perform the task at hand. The degree to which these feelings are experienced
also depends on the individual and the situation, as well as the level of education and skill. Generally,
a highly educated or skilled person requires a higher degree of challenge to perform well.
Stress, which is defined as physiological or psychological tension [57], is in some cases considered
purely negative; however, in the operation of a tanker, a certain level of stress is necessary in order to
provide sufficient challenge. Naturally, too much stress as well as too little stress will result in
nonoptimal performance, and therefore a balanced stress-level in between the two extremes is
considered desirable. In the case that high levels of stress are experienced, two natural tendencies of
human behavior often occur:
A limited number of response alternatives are considered
Cultural stereotypes become dominant
Optimum Performance
t
Facilitative Stress
t
Good Match
Bad Match
Disruptive Stress
Nonoptimal Performance
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In a stressful situation, the individual often loses the ability to consider all the aspects of problems and
solutions, and in most cases only the response alternatives the person knows by heart are truly
considered. Similarly, the individual reverts to his/her cultural stereotypes. Cultural stereotypes are
the expectations of groups of people regarding operations, controls, outcomes, meanings, etc. [57].
Examples of cultural stereotypes include turning a valve counterclockwise to open, turning the volume
control on a radio counterclockwise to decrease the volume, etc. With extensive training it is possible
to change cultural stereotypes; however, under high stress situations most people will naturally revert
to their cultural stereotype.
The level of stress should be considered in risk analyses for situations of very low levels of stress and
in situations of very high stress levels. In addition, the level of skill of the individual performing the
task should be included. In periods of extremely high levels of stress, the levels of training and
experience of an individual are the factors most likely to affect performance. A highly skilled person
is less likely to make mistakes compared to an unskilled person. The Handbook of Human Reliability
Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications recommends that the HEP values are
multiplied by varying constants, dependent on the level of stress involved in the specific situation [57].
These constants are listed in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2: Modifiers for Estimated HEPs for Situations with Varying Levels of Stress [57]
Multipliers
Stress Level Skilled Personnel Unskilled Personnel
Very low 2 2
Optimum 1 1-2
Moderately high 2-5 4 -10
Extremely high 5 - (HEP=0.25) 10 - (HEP=0.50)
The variances in the multipliers for the different stress levels result from the different rates of error that
are likely, depending on whether step-by-step tasks or dynamic tasks are involved. That is, if the tasks
follow step-by-step procedures, the lower value is used, and if the task is dynamic, the higher value is
used.
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3 Management and Organizational Issues
Management and the organization contribute either directly or indirectly in most accidents. It has been
shown that approximately 80% of major maritime accidents are the results of human and
organizational errors [10, 41]. The MOFs affect human behavior through policies, procedures, and
decisions made that affect the extent to which the PSFs influence the performance of tasks by
personneL In addition, the MOFs affect the performance of equipment and technical systems through
decisions made regarding design, maintenance, and operation.
The dominant types of errors found by the PTP Team' in casualty reports are shown in Figure 3-1 [17].
As seen from the figure, the direct management category, which involves shipboard, waterway, and
company policies and procedures, represents the most dominant type of error. The other types of
error, which also are related to management, are operator status, work environment, decision making,
and knowledge. Operator status involves errors due to mariner attributes such as fatigue, inattention,
vision deficit, and work load. The working environment category describes errors caused by the
natural and onboard working environments. Decision making includes items such as faulty
understanding of situations and decisions based on inadequate information. Finally, the knowledge
category deals with the mariner's knowledge and experience [17].
Work Environment
16%
Decision Making
21%
7Knowledge
..ZI z..2%
Operator Status
22%
Management
39%
Figure 3-1: Dominant Types of Error Found by the PTP Team in Casualty Reports [17]
The management of a shipping company makes a number of strategic decisions which directly
influences the risk associated with a tanker, and it is generally accepted that management and
organizational factors strongly influence accident probabilities. Therefore, identification and
improvement of management factors directly related to barrier or control provide a great degree of
safety assurance [12].
SUS Coast Guard Prevention Through People (PTP) Quality Action Team
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3.1 Tanker Operations and the Industry
The tanker industry is operating in a volatile market, which is prone to oversupply and uncertainty.
After the 1973 oil crisis, the tanker industry entered into a depression and freight rates fell, demoting
tankers to a cost item of minor importance. The result was a decrease in time chartering and decrease
in productivity [56]. In addition, the availability of financing and government subsidies have
minimized the barriers to the market. However, due to the highly fragmented market, the shipping
companies exercise little pricing power. The result is an over supply of tankers which compete for
below cost freight rates. This leads to tanker owners attempting to reduce cost as much as possible [3].
Cost cutting strategies involve the reduction or absence of proper maintenance, extending the life of the
tanker, registering the tanker under a "Flag of Convenience" (FoC), and reduction in training and
resources offered to the crew. Reducing the amount of maintenance is a short-term solution at best.
By investing in the proper maintenance, the vessel will operate more efficiently, the life of the vessel
may safely be extended, and the probabilities of malfunctions and failures are dramatically reduced.
Therefore, in the long-term, proper maintenance represents a more cost-efficient type of operation.
Extending the life of a substandard vessel involves a large amount of risk due to the possibility of
material failure. It has been determined that 99 percent of tanker losses in 1992 involved ships which
were at least 17 years old [27]. Unfortunately, the average tanker age is increasing by 5 percent per
year [47]. Registering vessels under a FoC may result in tax benefits, the possibility of crewing ships
with low-wage labor, as well as less stringent inspections and classifications. A tanker registered under
a FoC may, although not necessarily, imply a substandard vessel or substandard operations. That is, a
tanker under a traditional flag implies a vessel in good condition, operated in a responsible manner,
while this is not necessarily the case with a FoC registered vessel. Regarding training and resources
provided, these factors are dependent on the organization or company operating the tankers. Third
party management, in which the shipowner pass the responsibilities for operations to a professional
ship management organization, is widespread. On one hand, it may be argued that these organizations
consist of experienced professionals and therefore are able to perform the tasks as well as any. The
experience of the operating company greatly influences the operation; an experienced company is
likely to utilize knowledge gained from past experience in order to improve future performance. On
the other hand, these organizations are merely paid for doing a job, i.e., these organizations are less
involved in the fate of the operations and therefore decisions may be more focused on the short-term
aspects of the operations than the long-term aspects.
There are still too many substandard vessels in operations; however, especially due to the large awards
arising from the Exxon Valdez accident and punitive legislation such as OPA-90, the tanker industry is
now attempting to reduce their potential liability [56]. Large oil companies, in particular, are taking a
very responsible and conservative approach to reducing tanker risk. In order to decide upon the most
cost-effective approach, companies and legislators need methods to systematically analyze tanker risk,
including factors related to the organization and the management of the vessels.
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3.2 The Organization
The influence of the organization on the reliability of maritime systems is one of the most pervasive of
human failure-related root causes [8]. Even though errors may be directly caused by the front line
operator, it is the design of the system or the organization that influences the operator. It is necessary
to move away from the tendency to treat human failure at the local level, and to focus rather on the
global context of the organization. The search for root causes must replace the practice of punishing
the final human link [15].
The organization defines the environment in which the personnel work and live, sets policies, and
makes major decisions regarding the operations of the tanker. When the organization is successful, the
result is likely to be a well-functioning, safe, and efficient crew. The opposite is true when the
organization is not performing adequately. Organizations have an impact on individual response
through their structure and culture, both of which are functions of each other [2]. In addition, there
must be congruence between the different aspects of the organization, e.g., congruence between
objectives, goals, policies, matching of personnel and tasks, etc.
3.2.1 Organizational Structure
The organizational structure, which is the necessary framework within the organization and the
responsibility of the management, greatly impacts the operation of the vessel. In the maritime industry,
both the hierarchical and horizontal types of organizational structures, representing two extremes, are
present. The organizational structure most commonly adapted in traditional maritime nations is the
hierarchical structure. Leadership is important to maintain order and discipline, and the hierarchical
structure provides for an overall monitoring of and influence on activities. However, the hierarchical
structure, which is associated with unidirectional, top-down communication and coordination, may
result in discouragement regarding participation by the crew. In some instances, detected problems
and potential solutions may not reach the management of the organization due to inadequate bottom-up
channels. The hierarchical structure is often associated with the absence of role flexibility, i.e., a
departmental structure with narrow, fixed roles [61]. An additional characteristic associated with the
hierarchical structure is the class distinctions among the crew, which may result in tension in certain
situations. The social structure onboard ships has traditionally been fragmented and stratified, but
recent changes in some companies have resulted in a structure that is more flexible, with a deemphasis
of status symbols [61]. The horizontal type of organizational structure allows for increased
participation by the crew with respect to decision making and communication. The horizontal structure
is often accompanied by role flexibility, in which the roles are more broadly defined and assignment
patterns are more flexible. This involves crossing of traditional boundaries, such as the boundary that
exists between the deck and the engine room. However, the horizontal structure may also result in
problems with order and discipline if not carried out correctly. Regardless of the type of
organizational structure, effective and efficient lines of responsibility, coordination, and
communication should be established.
The division of labor and coordination of effort largely determine the structure of the organization
[22], while administrative control reinforces the organizational structure. Division of labor enables an
overall task to be decomposed into subtasks to be performed by groups or individuals. It consists of
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the creation of teams formed according to functional specialization, and it may include shorebased and
shipbased divisions, bridge and deck divisions, officers and crew divisions, etc. Coordination of work
integrates the subtasks into a single effort. It consists of information-based decision processes
developed to accomplish the overall task. Both formal and informal coordination mechanisms, such as
policies, procedures, vertical and horizontal channels, scheduled and unscheduled meetings, should be
utilized in support of the decision making processes [16]. Administrative control, which refers to the
extent to which policies are carried out and adequately monitored, reflects the type of organizational
structure inherent in the company. Administrative control reinforces the lines of responsibility and
coordination, and good administrative control systems can significantly reduce the probabilities of
certain types of errors [57].
The organization should establish an effective and efficient structure of communication. In the case
that an organizational structure is to complex, the established communication flow-paths may lead to
faulty decisions and result in little or no feedback to the management. In addition, the existence of
clearly defined incentive structures is critical to the success of the organization. The incentive
structures should specify how individuals are rewarded, what decision criteria are used, and how the
criteria fit the overall objectives of the organization [3].
3.2.2 Organizational Culture
In addition to organizational structure, management and organizational impacts are results of the
culture of the organization; the structure and the culture are functions of each other. For instance, the
hierarchical structure, even though the optimal structure in some cases, may result in a culture not
encouraging bottom-up communications or the provisions of reward [42].
The organizational culture refers to the shared perception of the organization, and it involves the
traditions, values, and goals by which the organization may be characterized. The culture of the
organization influences to a large extent the manner in which the personnel act, carry out tasks, and
socialize. For example, the goals set by an organization may induce otherwise rational people to make
irrational decisions. Pressures to reduce costs and maintain schedules may result in unsafe operations
and are currently a problem in the maritime industry. Another problem with respect to culture that is
often encountered in organizations is related to the manner in which messages and feedback are
handled. Typically, two natural tendencies are likely to be encountered; critical messages tend to flow
downward and commendatory messages tend to flow upward [23]. That is, the management does not
adequately provide positive feedback to the crew, while the crew does not adequately provide
constructive criticism to the management. In order to achieve a more effective system, these
tendencies should be reversed. In conjunction with emerging technologies, corresponding emphasis
should be placed on the organizational aspects of utilizing the technology to manage operations more
effectively and safely. The maritime industry generally responds slowly to technological changes;
however, this part of the maritime culture is gradually changing. A number of companies have realized
that the potential useful aspects of different information technologies.
The safety culture of an organization encompasses issues of multidimensional domains, both structural
and attitudinal, and it relates to both organizations and individuals [6]. It is one of the fundamental
management principles necessary for the safe operation of the tanker, i.e., the achievement of total
system safety is dependent on the existence of a safety culture which is properly defined. In order to
operate safely, the organization should have both a formally established safety culture and an
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environment of safety consciousness. If this is not the case, the layers of safety precautions may more
easily be breached. Four characteristics defining the adequacy of the safety culture are the following
[63]:
* Knowledge acquired by personnel regarding safety
* Attitude of personnel toward safe operations
* Choice of performance goals
* Establishment of lines of responsibilities and communication
The safety culture is largely influenced by the attitude of personnel at all levels of the organization in
responding to and benefiting from the organizational structure.
3.2.3 Organizational Congruence
An organization is ideally a dynamic structured entity which changes and adapts to meet activities and
the environment, and it has the ability to either enhance or degrade individual performance. In addition
to the organizational structure and culture, congruence with respect to the different aspects of the
organization is of importance. When evaluating system performance of an organization, congruence
between the following factors should be considered [23]:
* Objectives, goals, and policies
* Practices and organizational characteristics
* Personnel and tasks
* Rewards and requirements
* Personnel and environment
Congruence between company objectives, goals, and policies at all levels of the organizational
structure is important. In the case that this is not achieved, the result is often confusion as well as
conflicting motives with respect to performance. The management practices should also be consistent
with the characteristics, or the culture, of the organization. In order to optimize the manning situation
on a vessel, the people performing the tasks should be matched with the characteristics of the tasks. In
order to maximize the effect of rewards and incentives, the rewards must balance the performance
requirements. Finally, the work environment should be matched to the employee needs.
3.3 Categories of Organizational Factors
In a root-cause analysis of work processes, a number of organizational factors influencing the behavior
of workers are identified by R.W. Tulli and G.E. Apostolakis [59]. Each of the factors are associated
with various organizational categories, shown in Figure 3-2 [59]. (The organizational factors are
defined in Appendix II.) The five organizational categories identified are decision making,
communication, administrative knowledge, human resource allocation, and culture [59]. The decision
making category consists of centralization, goal prioritization, organizational learning, and problem
identification, while the category of administrative knowledge consists of coordination of work,
formalization, organizational knowledge, and defined roles and responsibility. The communications
category consists of external, interdepartmental, and intradepartmental communication, and the human
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resource allocation category consists of performance evaluation, personnel selection, technical
knowledge, and training. The category titled culture is not a regular organizational factor category in
that it influences all the other four categories. The culture is divided into organizational culture,
ownership, safety culture, and time urgency. The organizational factors are discussed in further detail
in Chapter 7.
Decisions making Communications Administrative knowledge Human resource allocation
Centralization External Coordination of work Performance evaluation
Goal prioritization Interdepartmental Formalization Personnel selection
Organizational learning Intradepartmental Organizational knowledge Technical knowledge
Problem identification Roles and responsibilities Training
Culture
Organizational culture
Ownership
Safety culture
Time urgency
Figure 3-2: Organizational Factor Categories
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4 The International Safety Management Code
Management and organizational impacts on human performance may be improved through the
implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. In a move away from traditional
technical and hardware requirements, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated the
ISM Code to include human and organizational aspects associated with both vessel and shoreside
management. The preamble to the ISM Code states:
The cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from the top. In matters of
safety and pollution prevention it is commitment, competence, attitudes, and motivation
of individuals at all levels that determines the end result [28].
The intent of IMO is to provide a framework for a safety management system that will result in better
policies and procedures, and thereby create more knowledgeable, trained, motivated, and safer crews
[3]. The ISM Code provides an opportunity for companies to identify, evaluate, and manage risks
identified. In order for a management policy to be effective it must be active and constantly evolving;
an active management policy will increase the understanding of responsibilities and interactions within
the system, and in that way result in improved performance.
With sensitive natural resources potentially affected by poor management of risk, it is
axiomatic that a vessel owner or operator adhere to a management model which
minimizes marine environmental risks and ensures compliance with all applicable laws
[42].
IMO Resolution A.741(18) was adopted on November 4, 1993, as the "International Management
Code for the Safe Operations of Ships and for Pollution Prevention - The International Safety
Management (ISM) Code." This resolution places responsibility on the company's management for
the manner in which the ships are operated, which is different from developing regulations covering
ship structure and equipment, or from establishing requirements on how to train and certificate
seafarers such as in the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). The ISM Code mandates that shipowners and operators have a
management system which ensures that both safety and pollution prevention are central in operations.
The code introduces to a certain extent the concept of self-regulation; the requirements involve internal
audits and management reviews. In addition, it requires each company to develop instructions and
procedures for the safe operation of their ships.
The voluntary period for ISM certification began in May 1994, when the Code was incorporated in
Chapter IX of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations. In order to comply with Chapter IX of
the SOLAS Convention, ships must be operated by a company complying with the requirements of the
ISM Code and therefore holding a Document of Compliance (DOC). The ships are issued with a
Safety Management Certificate (SMC) by the Flag State Administration or by an organization
recognized by this administration. The requirements of the ISM Code will become mandatory for
different vessels as follows [28]:
July 1, 1998: - Oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers, and high
speed cargo crafts of 500 gross tonnage and upward
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- Passenger ships including high speed passenger crafts
July 1, 2002: - Other cargo ships and mobile off shore drilling units of 500 gross
tonnage and upward
IMO has encouraged member states to urge shipowners to voluntarily adopt the ISM Code prior to
these dates. However, only a relatively small percentage of companies and ships have achieved
certification to this date.
4.1 Summary of the ISM Code
The objectives of the ISM Code, as stated in the text of Resolution A.741(18), are as follows:
The objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or
loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular, to the marine
environment, and to property [30].
In order to comply with the ISM Code, and for the company to be awarded the DOC and the ships to
be issued with the SMC, the objectives of the company must include the following:
The safety management objectives of the company should provide for safe practices in
ship operation and a safe working environment, establish safeguards against all identified
risks, and continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and aboard
ships [30].
The company must develop, implement, and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS), which
ensures the compliance with all mandatory rules and regulations, as well as consideration of all
applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by IMO, governments, classification
societies, and maritime organizations and industry. The SMS should be a structured and documented
system ensuring the implementation of safety and environmental protection policies. It must include a
safety and environmental protection policy, including procedures to ensure safe operations of the
vessels and protection of the environment in compliance with mandatory international and flag state
legislation. The SMS must contain defined levels of authority and lines of communication between
and amongst shore and shipboard personnel, procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities,
procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations, and procedures for internal audits and
management reviews.
The term "company" means the owner of the ship or any other organization or individual who has
assumed the responsibility of the ship, while the term "administration" means the government of the
state whose flag the ship is entitled to fly [30].
4.1.1 Safety and Environmental Protection Policy
The purpose of the safety and environmental protection policy is to describe how the objectives
regarding safety and environmental protection are to be achieved. The company must ensure that the
policy is implemented and maintained throughout all levels of the organization. The safety and
environmental protection polices should be in harmony with other existing company policies, such as
quality policies and mission statements. In order to be effective, the policy, consisting of goals,
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objectives, and strategies, should be an element of the general policy [38]. It is also important that the
safety and environmental protection policy receives the same attention as all other policies.
4.1.2 Authority, Responsibility, and Lines of Communication
The company must define and document responsibility, authority, and interrelation of all personnel,
and it should ensure that adequate resources are provided. All personnel must be given clear and
unambiguous definitions of their responsibilities and authorities. The resources needed will vary, but
typically resources will include such items as equipment, financial support, competent personnel, and
training.
One or more persons ashore, having direct access to the highest level of management, must be
designated in order to provide a link between the company and the people on board. The designated
persons should be responsible for verifying the effectiveness of the SMS, reporting deficiencies to
management, and for ensuring that adequate resources are received in a timely manner. The master
should function as the designated person's shipboard counterpart regarding reporting deficiencies to
management and ensuring that corrective actions are completed.
The responsibilities of the master must be defined and documented with regard to implementing the
environmental protection policy, motivating the crew, issuing orders and instructions, verifying that
specified requirements are observed, and reviewing the SMS. The company must also ensure that the
SMS contains a statement emphasizing the master's authority. The management of the company should
allow the master's overriding authority in the best interest of safety and the environment. The
company must also ensure that the master has the required level of training and is fully competent to
perform all duties within the scope of the SMS. More specifically, the ISM Code requires the
company to ensure that the master is [30]:
* Properly qualified
* Fully conversant with the company's SMS
* Given the necessary support to safely perform his/her duties
Each ship must be manned with a qualified, certified, and medically fit crew in accordance with
national and international requirements. (This requirement establishes a link between the ISM Code
and the STCW Convention.) Procedures must be established to ensure that new personnel transferred
to new assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization
with the relevant tasks. All personnel involved in the SMS must have adequate understanding of the
rules, regulations, codes, and guidelines that apply, and the training required in support of the SMS
must be provided. It is also important that the personnel receive the information regarding the SMS in
languages understood by them.
4.1.3 Procedures for Operation and Emergency Situations
Procedures must be established for the preparation of plans and shipboard operations concerning safety
and pollution prevention. The company should ensure that all planned activities for normal operations
are carried out correctly by specifying clear procedures and instructions, and that all the existing
procedures are in harmony with each other.
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The ISM Code requires the company to establish procedures to identify, describe, and respond to
potential emergency situations. Programs for drills and exercises to prepare for emergencies should be
developed, and the SMS should provide for measures ensuring that the company can respond to an
emergency situation at any time. The emergency response plans should be developed with respect to
the particular ship, the ship's equipment, and the type of operation in which the ship is involved. It is
also important that contact information is included in the plans and is updated whenever necessary.
4.1.4 Reporting of Accidents and Non-Conformities
The SMS must include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents, or hazardous occurrences
are reported, investigated, and analyzed with the objective of improving the situation. The company
should also establish procedures for implementation of corrective action. These requirements ensure
that the company is maintaining the SMS and that it is continuously improving the safety management
skills of the personnel. Continuous improvement is of importance because as the SMS matures, the
benefits of the system increase.
4.1.5 Maintenance of Systems and Equipment
The company must also establish procedures in its SMS to identify critical equipment systems that may
result in hazardous situations in the case of failure. Also, the ship must be maintained in conformity
with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations. In meeting this requirement, the company
should ensure that [30]:
1. Inspections are held at appropriate intervals
2. Any non-conformity is reported
3. Appropriate corrective action is taken
4. Records of these activities are maintained
The reporting of accidents, near-misses, and non-conformities will provide for more complete
databases which may be utilized in risk analyses.
4.1.6 Documentation
The company must distribute and maintain Safety Management Manuals, describing the SMS, and
relevant information to all personnel associated with the SMS. Also, each ship must carry on board
documentation relevant specifically to the ship. Procedures must also be established and maintained to
control all the documents relevant to the SMS. The procedures must ensure that [30]:
* Valid documents are available at all relevant locations
* Changes to documents are revised and approved by authorized personnel
* Obsolete documents are promptly removed
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4.1.7 Internal Audits and Reviews
The company must carry out internal safety audits, and periodically evaluate the efficiency of the SMS
in accordance with established procedures. The audits and possible corrective actions must be carried
out in accordance with documented procedures, and the personnel carrying out audits must be
independent of the areas audited unless this is too impracticable. (This will normally depend on the
size of the company.) The results and reviews must be brought to the attention of the appropriate
personnel, and corrective action should be taken immediately when deficiencies are found.
4.1.8 Certification
The DOC is issued to companies complying with the requirements of the ISM Code by the
administration or an organization recognized by the administration. A copy of the DOC is placed on
board the ship, together with a SMC issued to the ship. When issuing the SMC, the administration
verifies the proper functioning of the SMS and that the company and its shipboard management
operate in accordance with the approved SMS.
4.1.9 Implementation
In order to meet the requirements of the ISM Code, the company should analyze all aspects of design,
construction, maintenance, and operation of their vessels, identify those items that have the greatest
impact on risk, and develop preventive measures for these items. If properly done, this can assist the
company in improving the safety and the economy of their operations [10]. The ISM Code provides a
link between safety and the officers and crew on board; if the crew only considers the SMS as a piece
of paper, without including the principles in their daily practice, deficiencies and non-conformities will
continue. In order to effectively delegate the tasks involved in safety and pollution prevention, the
crew must fully understand the reasons behind the specific tasks, and the management delegating the
tasks must realize the potential consequences of the requirements not being met [37]. Effective
implementation of the ISM Code concerns important factors impacting vessel operation including
training, experience, fatigue, maintenance, motivation, morale, etc. [13].
4.2 Benefits of the ISM Code
The benefits of the ISM Code include reduction in marine accidents and economic savings. The
implementation of the code is very likely to result in fewer casualties and a reduction in pollution
incidents resulting in environmental damage. The reduction in casualties will lead to reductions in cost
due to reduced shipboard personnel injuries and the associated liabilities, as well as reductions in costs
with respect to insurance claims. The decreased numbers of pollution incidents will reduce company
and vessel liability as well as regulatory fines. In addition, due to the established and clearly defmed
lines of authority and communication, fewer delays might be expected as a positive outcome. Cost
savings will also be a result of such factors as reductions in lost work hours due to injury, loss of vessel
operation due to repairs, and costs associated with legal problems. These cost savings should outweigh
the startup and maintenance expenses for the company.
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4.3 Organizational Factors Emphasized by the ISM Code
The ISM Code provides an instrument for shifting the focus towards the management of the companies
involved in tanker operations. A number of management issues are emphasized by the ISM Code, and
some of the organizational factors associated with these issues deserve special attention. The MOFs
specifically emphasized by the ISM Code are the following:
* Organizational Culture
* Safety Culture
* Organizational Learning
* Formalization
* Coordination of Work
* Communication
* Personnel Selection
* Training Process
The company seeking certification must develop objectives and policies related to the safe operation of
the ship and it must ensure that personnel at all levels of the organization understand and accept the
purpose and relevance of these goals. The culture of the company influences every aspect of the
organization. Organizational culture refers to the personnel's shared perception of the organization,
and it includes traditions, values, customs, and practices found in an organization; it is what sometimes
is referred to as the "personality" of the organization. Related to the organizational culture is the safety
culture, which refers to the characteristics of the work environment which influences the personnel's
perception of the importance the company places on safety. The importance of an organizational
safety culture is the underlying concept of the ISM Code. It is stated that the company is required to
develop a management system which ensures that safety and pollution prevention is central in the way
they operate. It is also emphasized that the SMS should be in harmony with all other company
policies.
The emphasis on inspections, internal audits, investigations, and reporting of non-conformities is
important for organizational learning. Organizational learning refers to the degree to which the
organization uses knowledge gained from past experience to improve future performance. The reviews
and analyses of reports, as well as corrective actions that are carried out by the company, are of great
importance in order to reduce risks.
Formalization refers to the extent to which there are well-identified procedures and standardized
methods for routine activities as well as unusual occurrences. The importance of formalization is
highlighted throughout the ISM Code. It is mandated that instructions and procedures are established,
implemented, and maintained for normal operations, audits, non-conformities, emergencies, and
accidents. In addition, documents and records should be valid, changed as required, and removed
when they have become obsolete.
Coordination of work is underscored as the company is required to define and document levels of
authority, responsibility, and interrelations. The company must also designate persons who should
function as a link between the company and shipboard personnel. Regarding communication, the code
stresses the establishment of lines of communication between shore and shipboard personnel, which
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may be defined as interdepartmental communication. This refers to informal and formal
communication lines between different departments or units within a company. The code states that
information regarding the SMS should be provided in languages understood by all personnel, which
may refer both to the type of language as well as the level of difficulty.
Personnel selection refers to the degree to which personnel have the required knowledge, experience,
skill, and ability to perform the specific tasks. The ISM Code makes it clear that the ships should be
manned with qualified, certified, and medically fit seafarers. Even though training requirements comes
more specifically under the STCW Convention, it is also a concern of the ISM Code. In addition, the
importance of emergency drills and exercises are emphasized by the Code. The training process factor
refers both to the availability and quality of the training provided.
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5 Risk Assessment and Management
The maritime industry is regularly identified as one involving high risk operations, which requires
active risk management programs [4]. Risk assessment and analysis, which involves the identification
and evaluation of risks involved in operations, reduce risk as knowledge and awareness are gained.
Similarly, risk management is a systematic approach utilizing risk assessment methodologies to
determine risk and risk reducing potential, and in this way assist in the management of limited
economic resources. That is, instead of alleviating for all conceivable risk, risk management enables
the allocation of resources to risk relevant areas.
5.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Risk analyses have been developed in a number of industries; however the method of probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) has primarily evolved in the nuclear industry. Nuclear power stations and oil
tankers both result in public concern and anxieties, and therefore similar risk reducing methods as
those utilized in the nuclear industry may be developed for maritime operations.
The PRA analysis has its foundation in fault and event tree methodology. The fault and event tree
approach consists of discrete logical diagrams explicitly showing the casual relationships within a
system, which determine the probability of accident scenarios [3]. The event tree is an inductive
model, whereas the fault tree is a deductive model [57]. Both of these approaches are discussed in the
following section.
5.1.1 Fault and Event Trees
The fault tree approach is a widely used method of analysis for systems with multiple failure modes. It
is a graphic representation of basic component failures which in various combinations may result in an
overall system failure state. The fault tree method is a qualitative approach; however it provides a
framework for a quantitative evaluation. The method involves identifying the system failure or
undesirable event in as broad form as practicable in order for all possible combinations to be
evaluated. By deductively working backwards, all combinations of failure may be explored. The
appropriate probabilities are assigned to the basic component failures, and finally the probability of the
top event is calculated using Boolean form calculations. The result is a reduced Boolean form
expression representing the fault tree [3].
The event tree approach is a logic model demonstrating the relationships among the different events
occurring, enabling the investigation of risk systematically in an integrated fashion. The event tree is a
graphic representation of the progression of system events, following the occurrence of an initiating
event, in which the events are represented by limbs in the tree. The branches show the success or
failure mode and the combinations of actions and barriers in a specific task. Each limb of the event
tree represents a binary process; as an event is carried out, it is either completed successfully or
unsuccessfully. Success is designated by a left limb in a branching and failure is designated by a right
limb. The values assigned to the limbs are conditional probabilities, and in any branching in the tree
the sum of the limbs is 1.0 [57]. The event trees consist of three parts; initiating events, barriers, and
end-states. The initiating event is an event which may set off an accident sequence. The barriers are
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safeguards placed in the path of the potential accident sequences and consist of operator actions and
safety system responses. The end-state is the consequence of an accident sequence based on whether
or not the sequence was stopped by any of the barriers [15]. The system is modeled with sequential
logic, the sequence moves forward in time, and it is assumed that each path is mutually exclusive.
The different portions of the fault tree may be further analyzed and quantified by utilizing event trees.
That is, event trees may be developed to determine failure probabilities to be assigned to the fault tree.
By developing event trees for the different work processes, the fundamental components of the
processes are sequenced in a manner that incorporates the basic faults identified in the fault tree [3].
5.1.2 Human Reliability Analysis
In PRA, Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is utilized to estimate human error contribution to the
failure of system components and functions. Human reliability is defined as the probability of
successful human performance, and HRA is a method by which human reliability is estimated [57].
The method combines schematic representations of human events and related system events, as well as
their interactions. The HRA method involves the identification, analysis, and estimation of Human
Error Probabilities (HEPs) for human tasks critical to the system [57]. The method of HRA involves
the following steps [3]:
1. Define system and process failure
2. Perform task analyses
3. Estimate relevant error probabilities
4. Determine effects of individual errors on system failure events
5. Recalculate system failure probabilities
The first step, identifying system and process failures, involves defining the system functions that may
be influenced by human errors and for which error probabilities are to be determined. The second step
involves performing task analyses. Task analyses, discussed in Section 5.1.2.2, include listing and
analyzing the related human operations. The third step is the estimation of the relevant human error
probabilities, while the fourth and fifth step involve the estimation of human errors on system failure
events.
Human error was previously defined as a departure of acceptable or desirable practice on part of an
individual or group of individuals when performing specific tasks. It includes any element of a set of
human actions which exceeds some defined limit of acceptability [57]. HEPs are the probabilities that
errors will result from the performance of specific tasks. The Technique for Human Error Rate
Prediction (THERP) is a method employed to quantitatively predicting individual HEPs. The original
data, used to support the THERP data tables, was developed at Sandia National Laboratories. The
basic HEPs are estimated for fundamental generic tasks which may collectively comprise a specific
series of tasks.
5.2 Process Analysis
The planning, piloting, and decision processes involved in grounding can be defined by a series of
standard steps which are common to many processes. That is, the processes may be defined as
standardized sequences of tasks, following predictable flow paths from beginning to end, designed
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within the operational environment of the organization to achieve specific goals [15]. The assumption
that the processes involved in tanker operations follow set patterns permits the application of the data
developed at Sandia National Laboratory, assembled in the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis
with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications [57].
The processes whose constituent tasks have direct influence on operation of the ship may be classified
as front-line work processes, while those whose impact is felt indirectly may be classified as
supporting work processes [15]. The key processes, both front-line and supporting work processes,
involved in the operation are normally identified by reviewing documents and industry reports, as well
as conducting interviews. For each process analyzed, the goal is to determine in which way the
accumulation of failures may lead to unsafe conditions.
5.2.1 Task Analyses
A task analysis is an analytic process which involves determining in detail the performance required of
individuals and equipment within a system, as well as effects due to unexpected events. A task
analysis consists of the following steps [3]:
1. Evaluate performance required in carrying out tasks
2. Evaluate capabilities of personnel performing tasks
3. Determine possible deviations from anticipated tasks
4. Determine possible recovery actions
The task analysis focuses on tasks that are involved in the relevant processes and the personnel
involved in each of the tasks. It includes actions involved in each task and their failure modes, as well
as the defenses or barriers involved in each task and their failure modes. The defenses or barriers are
components built into the system to capture potential unsafe acts. A typical task involves two
sequential steps; the actions taken to achieve specific goals and the defenses or barriers to capture
errors made during the action step [15].
Normally, the product of the task analyses is flow diagrams, cross-reference tables, and
design/implementation checklists. The flow diagram identifies the tasks and their sequential
relationships, the cross-reference table specifies the actions, defenses, divisions, and personnel
involved in each task, while the checklist is a series of questions aimed at comparing design and
implementation of tasks in a given work process. The event trees may be graphic representations of
task analyses; the decision processes are modeled as binary events which result in either success or
failure [57]. By decomposing the tasks, the PSFs influencing the performance of tasks can be
identified. In assigning the error probabilities to the branches of the event tree, the data-tables
developed at Sandia National Laboratory may be used as the data source for estimating individual error
probabilities [57]. The results of the event trees are then incorporated into the system fault tree.
5.3 Incorporating Organizational Influences Into PRA
Current PRA models do not explicitly model management and organizational dependencies of human
errors and system failures. In order to assess the impact of organizational factors on tanker operations,
it is necessary to develop models which allow for quantification and incorporation of this impact into
PRA. This gives rise to problems due to the informal aspects of the organization which is often
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superimposed upon the formal organization. That is, in their daily routine individuals within the
organization often depart from formally set standards [15]. In order to evaluate an organization, a
number of tasks must be performed, some of which are the following:
1. Determine how the organization functions
2. Determine how well the organization functions with respect to best and worst industry
practices
3. Evaluate the safety and environmental implications
4. Develop recommendations with respect to how the organization may be improved
The organizational structure of a company involved in tanker operations may be divided into the
functional areas illustrated in Figure 5-1. The primary coordinating mechanism of the functional
organizational areas is the standardization of tasks and types of work.
Ship Officers
Ship Crew
Shore-Based
Management Support-
Staff
Figure 5-1: Functional Areas of a Company Involved in Tanker Operations
Studies of major accidents from a variety of industries indicate that accidents rarely arise only from
random technical failures; usually disasters arise from a combination of a variety of human errors
influenced by organizational factors. In order to model organizational influences in accident
causations, a process involving the following three levels may be utilized [20]:
1. Human errors that lead to accident
2. Major immediate influences or error inducing factors which determine the likelihood of
the errors implicated (PSFs)
3. Higher level factors influencing lower level error inducing factors (MOFs)
The quantification of these influences may be achieved through influence diagram quantification
methods. Figure 5-2 demonstrates the pattern of the factors influencing human error [20].
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Direct Cause
Human Error Probability
Level 1 Influences
Performance Shaping Factors
Level 2 Influences
Management and
Organizational Factors
IMOFli
MOF2
I MOF3 I
Figure 5-2: Mapping of the Human Error Influences
The first level influences are the factors that represent a direct effect on the likelihood of occurrence of
the direct causes. The second level influences are management and organizational influences which
determine the likelihood that first level influences will be negative or positive. It is also possible to
include levels in between, such as division managers who interpret and implement directives from
upper management. The detailed structures of influences should be captured, and this may be
accomplished by conducting interviews or acquiring inputs from teams and individuals at all levels of
the organization, collecting related documents on work processes of interest, collecting information on
operating experience, and investigating accident and near-misses reports [20].
The first level influences should be weighed with respect to the specific human error, while the second
level influences should be weighed with respect to the first level influences. The second level
influence assessment is applicable across a range of systems, and therefore the assessment may only be
performed once for a generic model. The weights may be obtained from experts utilizing pairwise
comparison, i.e., assigning relative weights to organizational factors two at a time. The resulting values
are not probabilities, but assessments of weights of evidence regarding the variable being assessed.
However, the values can be treated as probability values for the purpose of calculations [20].
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5.4 Analytic Hierarchy Process
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) may be used to obtain the relative influence of the PSFs and
MOFs on human error relevant to the grounding scenario. The AHP method, discussed below, has
received widespread attention from academics and professional practitioners.
5.4.1 Background
The AHP method, developed by Thomas L. Saaty, is designed to solve complex problems involving
multiple criteria [32]. The method is similar to other decision process models, which are utilized for
cases in which numerous factors of decisions challenge people's cognitive abilities to evaluate and
process information and in which using intuition alone is not satisfactory [21]. AHP is designed as a
scaling procedure for measuring priorities in hierarchical structures, involving pairwise comparison of
attributes in terms of relative importance [53]. The process requires the decision maker to provide
judgments about preference and relative importance regarding alternatives, and the resulting product is
a prioritized ranking indicating the overall preference for the various alternatives [32].
5.4.2 Description
The AHP method reflects human beings' inclination to organize complex structures in hierarchies and
their tendency towards relative judgments [53]. A hierarchy is a linear structure used in decision
theory to represent the simplest type of dependence of one component/level of the system on another
in a sequential manner [50]. Outer dependence is the dependence on an attribute possessed by many or
all of the components, while an inner dependence is the dependence of one component on another
component [50]. The relative importance of the components in the hierarchy are ranked with respect to
the component above. The comparisons of two components at the time are fundamental to the AHP
method; it utilizes pairwise comparison in order to establish priority measures. AHP employs a scale
with values from 1 to 9 to rank the relative importance of two components. This nine unit scale, which
was arrived at empirically by Saaty and is consistent with Miller's magical number - seven plus two
[39], is a reasonable scale for discriminating between preference for two components [32, 53]. The
AHP method emphasizes consistency, but it can tolerate certain levels of inconsistency. However, if
inconsistency is very high, the decision should be re-examined or rejected as unreliable [51]. The
weights of the components are determined by normalizing the eigenvector associated with the
maximum eigenvalue of the ratio matrix resulting from the comparisons [53]. Generally, if the derived
weights for components 1 and 2 are w, and w2, respectively, the relative degree of preference or
importance of component 1 to component 2 is wl/w 2 [6a].
5.4.3 Criticism
Critics of AHP claim that the method is flawed as a procedure for ranking alternatives because the
rankings produced are arbitrary. That is, it is claimed that the process, which is based on the
assumption that the hierarchy compositions produce rankings based on consistent response, does not
result in rankings consistent with preference [19]. In addition, opponents of AHP contend that rank
reversals and distortions, due to addition or deletion of a component, demonstrate a fundamental flaw.
Proponents of AHP argue that the rank reversals and distortions are acceptable [52]. Thomas L. Saaty
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argues that, in contrast to traditional utility theory, rank reversal is not an issue with respect to AHP
[51]. Central to the controversy is the utility theory axiom which holds that bringing an additional,
irrelevant alternative into a decision should not affect the order of the old alternatives. In the case that
the additional alternative changes the order, even though it is irrelevant, there is a paradox because the
axiom is contradicted. However, Saaty holds that AHP does not include this axiom, and that irrelevant
alternatives are not part of the problem because in pairing the alternatives with existing relevant ones,
the additional alternatives are assigned importance, thus contradicting their irrelevance [51].
The primary advantage of AHP is that, with the exception of the eigenvalue calculations, the method is
very easy to understand [46]. Easily understood methods are appreciated by decision makers and the
people performing comparisons of alternatives. However, one criticism raised is that the method often
involves too many pairwise comparisons, and that balancing all the attributes may not always be
straightforward [46].
5.4.4 Expert Choice
AHP is widely and conveniently available through the computer interactive tool Expert Choice, which
is the leading software implementation of AHP [21]. The software provides easily understandable
questionnaires to be used in the pairwise comparisons. Following the recording of the comparisons,
Expert Choice determines the relative weights of the components. In addition, the software provides
various sensitivity analyses.
5.5 Ranking of Influence Factors
Usually in AHP models, the top level of the hierarchy is a single element or goal from which influence
emanates to the next level below. The remaining levels each have several elements to which influence
flow from the level above. The influences are determined by the performance of pairwise comparisons
on the elements with respect to the element above [50]. However, in the grounding analysis, the flow
of influence is from the lower level to the elements above. That is, the lowest level, consisting of the
MOFs, influences the level above, consisting of the PSFs, which again influences the top level,
consisting of the human error.
With the HEP as the top level of the hierarchy, all the PSFs impacting the specific HEP are identified
and ranked according to degree of influence. Similarly, all MOFs impacting each of the specific PSFs
are identified and ranked with respect to degree of influence. The rankings are obtained from experts
assigning relative importance to the factors two at a time, i.e., pairwise comparison. Once all the
factors are ranked and recorded, Expert Choice calculates relative weights for each factor with respect
to the given HEP. The weights are normalized, i.e., the weights add up to 1.0.
The factors being weighed should be mutually exclusive, which ensures that weaknesses or strengths of
management and the organization will not be disregarded or double-counted. However, this
requirement is seldom completely met when evaluating organizational factors [15]. For example,
factors related to culture do influence most of the other MOFs. Nevertheless, the AHP method may
still be used since, as long as reasonably mutually exclusive factors are used, it will produce
meaningful results [15].
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The experts performing the pairwise comparisons should be familiar with AHP and Expert Choice, as
well as the various aspects of the problem/situation being analyzed. For the grounding analysis, the
individuals performing the pairwise comparisons must be familiar with all aspects of vessel operations.
5.6 Summary
In conventional risk assessment, the impacts by management on operations are typically not taken into
account. Because of this, risk is nearly always underestimated [62]. An understanding of the risks
involved in tanker operations is necessary to achieve a balanced approach to safety and pollution
performance. Risk based management and decision processes provide the ability to identify and
evaluate uncertainties inherent in complex marine systems, and it may greatly improve general
management because all factors in the organization are analyzed and evaluated.
Figure 5-3: Probability Determination Process [3]
A systematic approach to manage risk, involves the process of identifying the tasks involved in the
company's operation, identifying the components influencing the processes, and evaluating the risks
associated with these. By utilizing this procedure, it is possible to make sound decisions regarding
policies, procedures, and possible corrective actions, as well as proposed legislation. Figure 5-3
demonstrates the sequence of steps utilized in order to evaluate the risks and estimate the probability of
grounding [3].
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6 Grounding Model
In order to carry out a meaningful analysis, a general waterway channel, ship, and typical ship track
characteristics are chosen. 2 The channel is chosen to be 200 m wide, have two lanes, and the number
of turns required are 10 left turns and 10 right turns. The ship is assumed to maintain a speed of 12
knots, and the average piloting cycle is assumed to be 3 minutes, i.e., the fix rate is 1/3 minutes'. The
track is taken to be along the center of the right hand lane in the two-lane channel. The total transit
distance is approximately 116 km, and the total transit time is approximately 5.2 hours. The track is
represented by a normal distribution with a mean of -50, and a standard deviation of 25 m. The
probability distribution function for the location of the ship relative to the center of the channel is
assumed to be a normal distribution around the center of the right hand lane, and is given by:
-(z - )2
1 2-a2
; z = [-100, 100]
gi = -50 m
0= 25 m
Given this distribution, the probability that the ship is outside the channel is 0.023, and the time the
ship is outside the channel, given the ship speed of 12 knots, is 7.108 minutes. The described
waterway is illustrated in Figure 6-1.
116km I
T
.....
100
x 5
Figure 6-1: General Waterway Channel
By selecting an assumed transiting scenario, the analysis is more easily understood, and it enables the
calculation of an estimated probability of grounding. It also enables a sensitivity analysis to be done
2 The grounding model is based on previous work done by M.D. Amrozowicz and A. Brown [2, 3, 4, 13].
f(z) = - e
2
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quantitatively for MOFs. The variables related to the scenario may easily be changed to represent an
actual scenario to calculate the probability of grounding for a specific waterway.
As discussed in Section 5.1.1, fault trees may be utilized when analyzing potential accident scenarios.
The top portion of the fault tree developed for grounding is shown in Figure 6-2. The gate
immediately preceding the grounding event in the fault tree has inputs from two types of grounding
events; powered grounding and drift grounding.
,:i K I
GOWEREDGROUNDING RIFT GROUNDING
Figure 6-2: Top Portion of Grounding Fault Tree
The Boolean expression for the probability of grounding, resulting from the structure of the fault tree,
is as follows:
PGrounding = PPoweredGrounding + PDriftGrounding
As seen from this expression, tanker groundings result from either powered grounding or drift
grounding.3 Powered grounding and drift grounding, related to the types of failures resulting in
grounding, are defined as follows [18]:
* Powered grounding
An event in which grounding occurs because the tanker proceeds down an unsafe track,
even though it is able to follow a safe track, due to errors related to planning or piloting
failure.
* Drift grounding
An event in which grounding occurs because the tanker is unable to follow a safe track due
to mechanical failure, anchor failure, assistance failure, and adverse environmental
conditions.
Powered grounding, with the accompanying fault tree, is discussed in Section 6-1, while drift
grounding, with its accompanying fault tree, is discussed in Section 6-2. Event trees are utilized to
analyze and quantify some portions of the fault trees; the event trees incorporate basic faults identified
in the fault trees and enable the calculation of the probability of failure of the different sequenced
3 In Boolean expressions, "+" is read as OR and "-" is read as AND.
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events. In the cases where human error is involved, the probabilities are determined from the data table
in the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications
[57].
6.1 Powered Grounding
The powered grounding portion of the grounding fault tree is shown in Figure 6-3. Due to the
importance of the bridge as the controlling station of the tanker, the majority of the contributing events
preceding accidents are caused by decisions made and actions taken on the bridge. These decisions
and actions are especially of interest when analyzing powered grounding. The fundamental failures
involved in a powered grounding are failures in planning and in piloting. The planning failures are
represented in Figure 6-3 by the Planned Track Unsafe-branch, while the piloting failures are
represented by the Course Deviates from Safe Desired Track-branch.
6.1.1 Passage Planning
Prior to departure and arrival, the mariner must make sure that the charts reflect the most current and
accurate information. This process involves checking various publications and notices to correct and
update navigational publications. Therefore, when analyzing the process of passage planning, it must
be determined whether or not the published changes affect the safe track. The probability of the
published changes affecting the track is conservatively estimated to 0.1. In the case that the published
changes affect the safe track, the probability of errors made in planning, as well as the planning
information being inaccurate, must be determined.
6.1.1.1 Error Made in Planning
Planning, and especially the passage plan, is essential elements of a successful voyage. The planning
process typically consists of the following events:
1. Initiate planning process
2. Check publications for changes
3. Plot changes on charts
4. Determine waypoints
5. Lay down track
6. Checking of plan by mate
7. Verification of plan by captain
In order to carry out the planning satisfactorily, the most current charts and other navigational
information must be available as well as updated to reflect the most recently published changes.
(Information may also be acquired through different radio broadcast services.) Failure to have accurate
and updated charts on board may result in legal implications, especially in the event that an accident
does occur. In order to update the navigational charts, the mariner must check all available
publications. The process involved in checking the periodicals for relevant changes is assumed
analogous to following procedures with no check-off provisions. Following the checking of the
periodicals, the changes must be transferred to the charts. The mariner will most likely have developed
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Figure 6-3: Powered Grounding Fault Tree
a list with the appropriate changes, which is similar to a check-list or procedure that a reactor
technician may use. Therefore the human error related to correctly entering or plotting the changes in
the appropriate charts is assumed to be similar to following procedures with check-off provisions [57].
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The task of determining waypoints for the passage involves studying the updated charts to determine
the track the vessel should follow in order to get from origin to destination. The task involved in
determining waypoints is assumed to be analogous to that of writing a procedural item [57]. The task
of laying down the track involves plotting the waypoints and determining the locations of any hazards
to navigation. This process requires use of dividers and simple mathematical calculations, which is
similar to a nuclear reactor technician's use of a micrometer, i.e., writing a procedural item with simple
arithmetic [57].
The first four events are assumed to be independent of each other, because it is unlikely that one event
will lead the operator to believe that the preceding event was performed incorrectly. However, the
process of laying down the track leads into the verification stage which provides a mechanism of
recovery. It is very likely that after the process of plotting the track, the plotter has a general idea of
the lay-out of the track, and because of this an error is more easily recognized. This verification
process functions as a recovery event, which is assumed to be analogues to the event of checking a
chart recorder with limits [57]. Similarly, the approval process requires that the captain verifies the
validity of the track. However, this task is assumed analogous to the task of hands-on checking [57].
A summary of the various HEPs related to the passage plan, which are analogous to various HEPs
given in the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant
Applications [57], are listed in Table 6-1.
Table 6-1: HEPs for Passage Planning [57]
Maritime Task Analogous Nuclear Power Plant Task HEP Uncertainty
Check publications for changes Following procedures with no check-off 0.003 0.0010-0.009
Plot changes Following procedures with check-off 0.001 0.0003-0.003
Determine waypoints Writing procedural item 0.003 0.0006-0.015
Lay down track Writing procedural item with arithmetic 0.010 0.0030-0.030
Recognize faulty track Check chart recorder with limits 0.002 0.0007-0.006
Captain properly verifies Hands-on type checking 0.010 0.0020-0.050
In order to quantify the probability that an error is made in the process of planning the track, event
trees are used. Figure 6-4 shows the event tree for the process of producing a successful or faulty plan.
The probability that the process results in a faulty plan, calculated using the equation derived from the
event tree, is:
PProducingFaultyPlan = 1-[PPublicationsAectPlan'(PCheckPub)(l-PPlot)'(l'Paypoints)'( lPLyTrack)
1.336 - 1+( 1 "PPublicationsAffectPlan)( -PWayVoints)'( -PLayTrack]
= 1.336 • 10-2
After laying down the track, the mate will most likely check over the plan to make sure it is correct,
and finally the captain is supposed to verify the track. The probability that errors are made in the
planning process is as follows:
PErrorsMadelnPlanning = PProducingFaultPlan'PRccognizeFaultyTrackPCaptainVerify
= 2.673 - 10'
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Figure 6-4: Event Tree for Producing Faulty Plan
6.1.1.2 Inaccurate Planning Information
In order to evaluate the probability that the planned track is unsafe, the probability that the information
used in planning the track is inaccurate must be determined. Inaccurate navigational information is
related to the following concerns:
* Unmarked channel hazards
* Channel not maintained properly
* Inadequate weather information
* Improper navigational aid location
A study analyzing data for four of the busiest ports in the US4 (San Francisco Entrance, New Orleans,
Baton Rouge, and Valdez) found that the total number of tanker accidents caused by incorrect planning
information between 1986 and 1990 were 19 [3]. The accident quotient, which is the number of
accidents due to faulty navigational information divided by the number of transits, was found to be
4.58 10-4. This value provides an estimate for the probability of inaccurate navigational information
causing an accident.
4 Data obtained from the USCG CASMAIN database and from the Army Corps of Engineers
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6.1.1.3 Planned Track Unsafe
The probability that the course involves an unsafe planned track is influenced by both the probability
that the incorrect navigational information causes an unsafe plan and the probability of making errors
in planning the passage. However, even though there are failures in the process of planning the
passage, the result is not necessarily an accident event. In the case that the vessel is transiting in open
water, for example, these failures may not lead to an accident. The probability that the erroneous track
actually intersects a hazard is assumed to be 0.5. (This probability is already included in the
probability of inaccurate information causing an accident.) The probability that the error is not
discovered while underway is assumed to be equal to the error involved in hands-on type checking.
The probability that the course follows an unsafe planned track is given by:
PPlannedTrackUnsfe = (PIncorrectnformation + PErrorMadenPanning PInt)ard ) PNootjsovered
= 4.581 - 106
6.1.2 Piloting
The piloting process is shown by the right portion of Figure 6-3. The sequence of events in a piloting
process is as follows [3]:
1. The actual course deviates from the planned track
2. A difference error between the actual course and the planned track is generated
3. A fix is taken and plotted
4. The difference error is detected
5. A correct course change is ordered
6. The helm responds correctly
The piloting error event is influenced by the probability that the course intersects a hazard, and that the
difference error is not detected by the crew and the captain or the probability that the action taken once
the difference error is detected is not sufficient to prevent an accident.
6.1.2.1 Difference Error Not Detected
The generation of a difference error between the actual course and the planned track is a function of the
accuracy and reliability of the radar and the Global Positioning System [3]. The probability of a sensor
error has been estimated to 9.5 - 10" [3]. The process of taking a fix involves taking at least two radar
ranges in order to estimate the position of the ship at the time the ranges were determined. The
navigator must read the ranges off the radar and plot them correctly on the chart. The probability that a
measurement error occurs when reading the ranges is analogous to an error when reading a digital
display and is equal to 0.001 [57]. When recording the information obtained, some skill is required
due to the use of dividers to plot the ranges at the correct scale. The task of plotting the fix is assumed
analogous to the task of recording readings and is equal to 0.001 [57]. The probability that the fix is
not correct is the sum of the probability of a sensor error, a measurement error, and an error involving
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in plotting the fix. The probability that the captain will fail to identify a fix measurement error is
assumed to be analogous to the task of hands-on checking and is equal to 0.01 [57].
PFixNotCorrt = (Pensor + PMsuement + PPlotFix PCaptain
= 2.95 - 10-5
The errors involved in the case that the mate fails to detect the plotted difference error is assumed
similar to the errors involved in checking a reading with limits and is equal to 0.001 [57]. The
probability that the captain fails to detect a bad fix is similar to the that for hands-on checking [57].
PDiffe ncErrorNotDetdByMeasurement = atcFailsToDetect ' PCaptainFailsToDetect ) + PFixNotCorrct
=3.95 - 10-5
The probability that the difference error is not detected visually is the sum of the probability that there
are no visual indications that the course deviates from the planned track, which is assumed to be 0.5,
the probability of poor visibility, which is assumed to be 0.25, and the probability that the lookout,
mate, and captain fail to detect the dangerous situation. The situation in which the lookout fails to
detect the hazard or assess the situation correctly is analogous to a check-reading task where the plotted
fix is checked to ensure that it is within tolerable limits of the planned track and is equal to 0.001 [57].
PDifferenceErrorNotDetectedVisually = PIndication + PVisibility + (PLookout ' PMate ' Pcaptain)
= 0.750
Finally, the probability that the difference error is not detected is the product of the probability that the
difference error is not detected by measurement and the probability that it is not detected visually:
PDifferencErrorNotDtected = PDifferenceErrorNotDetectedByMeasurement ' PDifferenceErrorNotDetectedVisually
= 2.963 - 10-
6.1.2.2 Insufficient Action to Eliminate Error
The probability of insufficient or incorrect action after the difference error is detected is given by the
probability of an untimely or erroneous action and the probability that the captain fails to correct the
error. The probability that the captain fails to correct the error is again given by the probability of error
related to hands-on checking [57]. The probability of untimely or erroneous action is influenced by
both the conning officer and the helmsman. Given that the error in the course is detected, the conning
officer determines the correct course change to order. The probability of error in this course change
order is assumed to be analogous to nonpassive task errors of commission and is equal to 0.003 [57].
Once the order to change course is given, the helm responds to the order, which involves turning the
wheel while watching the rudder angle indicator and the gyro repeater until the ordered course is
achieved. The probability of failure in responding to the order is given by the failure to recall two
instructions given orally and is equal to 0.003 [57].
PnsufficientAction = PCaptainFailsToCorrect (POrder + PResponse)
= 6.0 - 10
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The HEP values related to piloting, based on the data estimated in the Handbook of Human Reliability
Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications [57], are summarized in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2: HEPs for Piloting Error
Maritime Task Analogous Nuclear Power Plant Task HEP Uncertainty
Read radar ranges Reading a digital display 0.001 0.0003-0.003
Plot ranges Record readings 0.001 0.0003-0.003
Detect difference error (mate) Check reading with limits 0.001 0.0003-0.003
Detect difference error (captain) Hands-on checking 0.010 0.0020-0.050
Order course change Nonpassive task error of commission 0.003 0.0010-0.009
Respond to order Failure to recall two items given orally 0.003 0.0010-0.009
6.1.2.3 Course Deviates from Safe Desired Track
Based on the probabilities of failure related to not detecting the difference error and insufficient action
to eliminate the error, the probability of a piloting error is calculated as follows:
PPilotingError = PDifrenceErrorNotDetectd + PInsufficientAction
= 8.963 - 10-5
With the assumption that a fix is taken every 3 minutes, i.e., an average fix rate of 1/3 minutes-', the
average piloting error rate may be calculated to be:
EPilotingErrorRate = 2.988 - 10s errors/min
The probability that the course deviates from the direct or straight planned track is calculated assuming
a Poisson process for errors related to taking a fix. The probability that the ship is outside the channel,
as previously discussed, is 0.023, and the average time the tanker is outside the channel is 7.108
minutes. Failure is defined as at least one piloting error during the time the tanker is outside the lane.
PCourseDeviatesFromPlan-StraightTrack = POutsideChannel ' PErrorWhenOutsideChannel
= PutsidChanne (1 - e -EPilotingErrorRate -T(OutOfhanne))
= 4.884 - 10-
In the case that a fix error occurs, the time until the tanker is outside the channel may be calculated for
the assumed scenario. In the case that no fix is taken in a left turn, the distance to the point where the
tanker exits the channel may be approximated by 1/4 of the total channel width. Dividing this distance
by the vessel speed, the resulting time until the tanker exits the channel in a left turn is 8.089 seconds.
In the case that no fix is taken in a right turn, the distance to the point where the tanker will exit the
channel may be approximated by 3/4 of the total channel width. Dividing this distance by the speed of
the tanker, the resulting time until the tanker exits the channel in a right turn is 24.267 seconds. The
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probabilities that no fixes are taken before the tanker is outside the channel during a left and a right
turn, assuming Poisson processes for fixes, are as follows:
PNoFix-LefTm = A e
ra g Fix Rat e T(UntilOutsideChannel-LeftTurn)
= 0.956
PNoFix-RightTur = e Av erag eFi Ra te -T(UntilOutsideChannel-RightTum)
= 0.874
The probability that the course deviates in a turn from the planned safe track, assuming that the
probability of failing to turn is similar to that of following procedures with check off and the
probability of the captain failing to detect the failure is similar to that involved in hands-on checking, is
calculated below. Failure is in this case defined as taking no fix before exiting the channel on a turn.
PCourseDeviatesFromPlan- Tumrn - 1 - [1 PFailsTCaptainFailsToDetectFailurNofix-LetTuNumb eftTurns
[1 - PFailToTurn'PaptainFailsToDetectFailure'Nofix-RightTurn ]NumerOfghums
= 1.830 104
The probability that the course deviates from the desired safe track, and that the actual course is unsafe,
is calculated as follows:
PCourseDeviatesFromSafeDesiredTrack = (PCourseDeviatesFromPlan-StraightTrack+PCourseDviatesFrmPlan-Turn)PIntersectsHazard
= 9.394 - 10-5
6.2 Drift Grounding
Drift grounding, as previously defined, is an event in which the tanker is unable to follow the planned,
safe track. In order for drift grounding to occur, all of the following types of failures and conditions
must occur:
* Unsafe winds/currents
* Assistance failure
* Anchor failure
* Loss of steerage way
These failure conditions are illustrated in the drift grounding portion of the grounding fault tree, shown
in Figure 6-5.
6.2.1 Adverse Environmental Conditions
The term unsafe winds/currents means that the prevailing winds and currents lead the tanker towards a
grounding hazard. In order to assess the wind and current impact, an analysis of the prevailing winds
and currents must be carried out for the area of concern. For this analysis, with the assumed grounding
scenario, the probability that wind/currents cause the tanker to intersect a hazard is assumed to be 0.25.
__
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Figure 6-5: Drift Grounding Fault Tree
6.2.2 Loss of Way
Loss of steerage way is divided into two categories; loss of propulsion and loss of steering. Figure 6-6
shows the number of lost way incidents, based on a search of the USCG CASMAIN database, per year
from 1981 through 1991 [3].
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Figure 6-6: Loss of Way Incidents [31
A study, previously discussed in Section 6.1.1.2, analyzing four of the busiest ports in the US (San
Francisco Entrance, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Valdez) from 1981 through 1991, found that the
total number of tanker transits was 32,666, while the number of propulsion failures was 36 and the
number of steering failures was 14 [3]. The accident quotient was determined for propulsion failures
to be 1.10 10-3 and for steering failures to be 4.29 - 10- . The failure rates are dependent on transit
lengths, and therefore the accident quotients must be divided by the total number of transit miles,
estimated to be 340 miles for the four ports combined. The accident quotient for lost way, including
both propulsion failure and steering failure and assuming independence and rare event approximation,
is therefore calculated to be 4.5 x 10-6 per mile.
The probability of a loss of way accident is dependent on time. With a total transit time of the
assumed grounding scenario, calculated by dividing the total transit length by the ship speed, of 5.214
hours, the probability of loss of way is:
PLostWay = 1 -e-TotalTransitTime • XDrift
=l-TotalTransitTime • AccidentQuotient - VesselSpeed
= 3.240 - 10-4
6.2.3 Anchor Failure
Anchor failure is a result of mechanical failure associated with the anchor due to either maintenance or
operational error, administrative control, and/or unfavorable environmental constraints. Unfortunately,
as the size of many of the tankers operating has increased, the proportionate size of the anchors has
decreased. In order for the anchor to function properly, the vessel must have very little momentum,
i.e., less than 1 knot [18]. In the case that momentum is large, the anchoring system is likely to be
destroyed.
The successful deployment of the anchor is dependent on such factors as the type of anchor and chain,
the length of the anchor chain, sea depth, type of sea bottom, winds and currents, and the competence
'81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91
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of the crew [18]. However, in many cases, the main problem is that the deployment of the anchor is
not considered. A situation in which the decision has to be made regarding dropping the anchor or not,
may be characterized as extremely stressful. The captain realizes that if the anchor is dropped,
valuable transit time will be lost. However, in some case the consequences of not dropping the anchor
greatly exceeds those associated with lost transit time. Considering the extremely high stress level, the
situation is assumed analogous to that of a diagnosis after an abnormal event in a nuclear power plant.
The Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications,
estimates the HEP associated with this situation to be 0.25, with an uncertainty range of 0.05-1.00
[57]. It is assumed that this error probability is much larger than the probability for being unable to
operate the anchor.
6.2.4 Assistance Failure
Tankers escorted by dedicated tugs have a great advantage in that it permits rapid response to a steering
or propulsion casualty. Currently, very few dedicated tugs exist worldwide, and therefore for this
analysis, the tanker is assumed to be unescorted. Most areas rely on tugs of opportunity to provide
assistance, and the sequence of events in this case, for a tanker requiring assistance, is as follows:
1. Request assistance
2. Assistance arrives
3. Assistance ship ties up
4. Tanker is placed on safe track
The event tree for the basic sequence of events involved in a situation in which a tanker needs
assistance is shown in Figure 6-7.
Initiating Request Assistance Tug Ties Vessel Put Success/
Event Assistance Tug Arrives Up Safe Track Failure
S
F
F
F
F
Figure 6-7: Event Tree for Assistance Failure
The largest contribution to an assistance failure is typically the failure to request assistance in time. In
some cases, captains will take calculated risks by delaying the request for assistance in hope of
remedying the situation without help. The main concern of many captains is that they will receive a
"bad mark" if they request assistance before it is absolutely necessary. Similarly to the situation in
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which dropping the anchor is considered, the stress level is extremely high once the bridge crew
recognizes the need for assistance. Therefore, the situation is assumed similar to the situation of
diagnosis after an abnormal event. As discussed, in the Handbook ofHuman Reliability Analysis with
Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications this probability of error is estimated to be 0.25, with
an uncertainty range of 0.05-1.00 [57]. There is currently little information enabling the calculation of
the probability of the rescue tug arriving and tying up correctly, and therefore the probability of an
assistance failure is conservatively specified as 0.25. It is also assumed that the failure of requesting
assistance dominates the assistance failure error.
6.3 Summary of Grounding Probabilities
The equation for calculating the total probability of grounding, as previously defined, is the sum of the
probabilities of powered grounding and drift grounding.
PGrounding = PPoweredGrounding + PDriftGrounding
= 1.0358 - 10
where PPoweredGrounding = PPlannedTrackUnsafe + PCourseDeviatesFromSafeDesiredTrack
= 9.852 -105
PDriftGrounding PAdverseEnvironmentalConditions * PLostWay ' PAnchorFailure ' PAssistanceFailure
= 5.063 - 10-6
That is, the probability of grounding is the sum of powered grounding and drift grounding, with
powered grounding consisting of the sum of the probability that the planned track is unsafe and the
probability that the course deviates from the safe desired track, and the probability of drift grounding
consisting of the product of the probability that the tanker intersects a hazard due to unsafe
winds/currents, the probability of lost way, the probability of an anchor failure, and the probability of
an assistance failure. The resulting probability of grounding is dominated by the powered grounding
contribution, while the probability of powered grounding is dominated by the piloting contribution.
(More detailed calculations are located in Appendix III.)
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7 Modeling Human Error in Tanker Grounding
In order to determine the effect management and the organization have on human performance, PSFs
are identified and ranked with respect to the HEPs relevant to the grounding analysis, and MOFs are
identified and ranked with respect to the identified PSFs. By utilizing the AHP method, the MOFs of
greatest importance to grounding are distinguished from those that are of less importance.
As described in Section 5.2, the PSFs are level 1 influence factors, while the MOFs are level 2
influence factors, i.e., the PSFs function as intermediate variables between the MOFs and the HEPs.
The PSFs are factors which directly affect the ability of personnel to carry out tasks, while the MOFs
are factors which indirectly influence human performance in that they determine the likelihood of the
first level influences being positive or negative. The organizational factors also directly influence the
probability of equipment failure; however, this is outside the scope of this analysis.
7.1 Performance Shaping Factors
In order to evaluate the ability of humans to perform specific tasks, the various PSFs must be identified
and analyzed. By determining the PSFs, it is possible to identify means for improving performance.
The PSFs determine whether individual performance is highly reliable, highly unreliable, or in between
the two extremes. As previously discussed, the PSFs may be divided into two classes; internal and
external. Internal PSFs are characteristics of or factors within the individual. External PSFs are factors
outside the individual, i.e., factors defining the physical, social, and professional work situation. The
external PSFs fall into three categories; situation characteristics, task and equipment characteristics,
and instructions [57].
7.1.1 Descriptions of PSFs
A large number of PSFs have been identified and defined; however in order to simplify the grounding
analysis, only the most important PSFs are chosen for the pairwise comparison. (Additional PSFs, of
less importance to the grounding analysis, are listed in Appendix IV.) The following sections define
important PSFs that shape the performance of the individual mariner.
Inattention
Inattention involves the lack of full vigilance, or loss of attention, regarding the responsibilities or tasks
assigned. This is related to situations that result in a crew member being distracted from the primary or
necessary responsibility by others [31, 44]. It is also related to the condition in which the individual is
preoccupied with unrelated thoughts. Therefore, inattention is both a factor in high stress situations, as
well as in low stress situations. A typical result of inattention is the failure to monitor displays [44].
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Lack of Motivation
Lack of motivation refers to the lack of desire to perform required duties well [31]. In the case that an
individual is unhappy with his/her situation or a task that needs to be performed, the individual is very
likely to be less than highly motivated. In this way, lack of motivation refers to an individual's
negative attitude towards the company, other crew members, and operations.
Poor Physical Condition
In order to perform satisfactorily, the personnel must be in decent physical condition. Poor physical
condition refers to such factors as fatigue, poor physical fitness, physical problems, and the overall
well-being of the personnel. Fatigue is the reduction in physical, mental, or emotional capabilities as a
result of physical, mental, or emotional exertion [31]. It results in drowsiness and loss of vigilance,
and it may impair nearly all physical and mental abilities such as strength, speed, reaction time,
coordination, decision making, and balance. Poor fitness refers to inadequate strength, endurance,
precision, or ability to move with sufficient agility (in order to climb ladders, and inspect hatches and
hulls). The long periods of continuous work onboard the ship requires a certain physical stamina and
endurance, and an additional problem is that medical attention is not immediately available in this
environment [44]. The term physical problems is mostly related to visual problems, which refers to the
reduced visual acuity due to physical disability related to eye-sight. This term includes total or partial
blindness, not wearing prescribed glasses or contacts, or inability to adequately adapt to darkness or
distinguish between colors [31, 44]. The overall well-being of the personnel is greatly related to the
above mentioned variables. For instance, fatigue and poor fitness may result from the movement
restrictions imposed by the ship, which is a situation specific to the marine environment.
Poor Performance Ability
As will be discussed later, the greater the level of skill an individual possesses, the better performance
may be expected in situations with high-levels of stress. Poor performance ability includes the level of
training, experience, and the aptitude of the personnel. Inadequate training refers to the level of
education, instruction, and practice an individual has received. It includes all training prior to the
current job, as well as all training received by the company [31, 44, 57]. Lack of experience refers to
unsatisfactorily amount of time spent onboard the specific ship as well as on other ships [31, 44, 57].
Aptitude depends on the personnel's technical knowledge of ship operations and knowledge required
for specific tasks. This includes the personnel's general understanding and knowledge, including
phenomena and events that bear on safety [15]. The term involves knowledge regarding navigation,
general seamanship, propulsion systems, cargo handling, communications, weather, etc. [31].
Inadequate Knowledge of Procedures, Standards, and Regulations
Inadequate knowledge of procedures concerns the lack of knowledge of shipboard and company
policies regarding ship operations. The procedures include emergency procedures, maintenance
procedures, administrative procedures, and safety system procedures [31]. Inadequate knowledge of
regulations and standards relates to the lack of knowledge of company standards, national and
international regulations, other port states maritime regulations, local jurisdiction regulations,
shipboard regulations, cautionary notices, chart notions, or labeling [31].
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Conflicting Motives Regarding Performance
Conflicting motives regarding performance expectations refers to inadequate knowledge with respect
to priorities and company goals regarding safety of performance, quality of performance, schedules,
profitability, etc. This PSF is especially a factor in situations where the crew must determine a course
of action in which none of the alternatives are very tempting. For example, when developing the
passage plan, two alternatives might be to decide on a route that is fast but less safe, or a route that will
take a little longer to complete, but is much safer. In this case, the decision maker is left with the
choice between choosing the least time-consuming route which will save the company money, unless
an accident occurs, or choose the safer route which will be more expensive. In the case that the
decision maker is uncertain regarding the course of action to take, his/her performance will be less than
optimal. Conflicting motives may in some instances result in high levels of calculated risk, which is the
knowing acceptance of risk to meet personal and corporate priorities [44].
Poor Architectural Features
The architectural features of the ship may greatly influence the performance of the crew, and
specifically the bridge crew. Poor architectural features relate to the poor human factors engineering
design of a ship, its subsystems, its environmental controls, and human-machine interfaces [31].
Onboard a ship, poor instrumentation and overall design of the control station, or bridge, are current
problems [44]. The design of the bridge, such as the location of vital navigational equipment and the
size of the bridge affect the bridge crew. These factors have a great impact on safety because people
tend to avoid unnecessary effort and therefore attempt to read the displays from a distance. This
situation may be improved if the work space is designed around the radar displays. Additional
problems involve cluttered passageway and stairway design; hazardous decks and work surfaces;
inadequate restraints, guards, or hand-holds; poor workstation orientation in regard to ship dynamics;
poor hull seakeeping characteristics; controls which allow accidental actuation; and poor layout, sizing,
and coloring of controls and displays [57]. In addition, there is the problem of feedback delay,
specifically related to the marine environment, due to the slow response by large vessels[3].
Lack of Perception or Inadequate Situational Awareness
Lack of perception involves the situation in which an individual does not properly realize the existence
of a problem or situation, as well as misdiagnoses the problem or situation once it has been perceived.
Examples of this include misreading dials, mishearing commands, misunderstanding garbled radio
messages, etc. [31, 57]. Inadequate situational awareness relates to the lack of knowledge regarding
the current status of the ship, its subsystems, or its environment. This involves an incorrect
understanding of the current situation which result in a faulty hypothesis regarding future situations, or
a situation based upon incorrect beliefs leading to compounded errors. Examples of inadequate
situational awareness include lack of knowledge of location, heading, speed, or status of ongoing
maintenance [31].
Lack of Communication/Inadequate Exchange of Information
Lack of communication refers to the failure to communicate, or exchange information, regarding
problems and tasks aboard ship and ashore. This PSF includes communication between bridge
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officers, between deck and engine room, with pilots, and with the home office [31]. The
communication term also concerns mistakes in the act of giving commands, which includes the
absence of proper commands, commands given at an inappropriate time or out of sequence with
others, incorrect commands, or conflicting commands [31]. In addition, the term includes inadequate
language skills, which involve the lack of primary language abilities necessary to communicate and
perform required duties. It includes the ability to speak, read, as well as comprehend the information
being communicated [31].
Unawareness of Responsibilities
Unawareness of responsibilities refers to inadequate knowledge of the specific task required, or
confusion in lines of authority and responsibility. Examples of this include lack of understanding of
responsibilities with respect to operations, commands, communications, safety, maintenance, and
emergency situations [31]. This PSFs is especially critical in emergency situations, in which rapid
response is required. However, it is also of importance in routine operations as misunderstandings
with respect to responsibilities may actually cause emergency situations.
Hazardous Natural Environment
Specific to the marine environment is motion sickness in open waters. In restricted waters, the channel
width, traffic density, and availability of navigational aids are major factors that may create stress. In
the restricted maneuvering channels, many auditory and visual signals compete for attention, which
may result in the failure of ignoring some signals. The suddenness involved in having to adjust from
the open ocean scenario to the situation in restricted waterways is also a factor specific to the marine
environment. The hazardous natural environment PSF refers to the situation in which the natural
environment causes tasks to become more difficult than usual. Additional examples of such situations
include storms, shallow water, rocks, submerged wrecks, etc. [31].
7.2 Management and Organizational Factors
MOFs are factors that either directly or indirectly influence PSFs. The organizational structure and
culture affect the PSFs, and in this manner affect human performance indirectly. For instance, lines of
authority and communication, pressures to reduce cost and maintain schedule, administrative control,
rewards, and recognition all influence the way in which the mariners act.
The safety culture inherent in an organization influences all the MOFs and it is therefore removed from
the grounding analysis. Safety culture relates to the situation in which the characteristics of the work
environment, such as the norms, rules, and common understandings that influence personnel's
perception of the company, do not satisfactorily place importance on safety [15]. All the human errors
are functions of this factor, and with further research it may be possible to quantitatively relate the
safety culture to all the HEPs, with the other MOFs as well as the PSFs as intermediate variables.
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7.2.1 Description of MOFs
Similar to the methodology for the PSFs, in order to simplify the analysis, only the most important
MOFs are chosen for the pairwise comparison. (Additional MOFs are defined in Appendix IV.) The
following sections describe important MOFs that shape the PSFs, and in that way indirectly shape the
performance of the individual mariner.
Workload
Workload refers to such factors as the number of work hours, breaks, and the overall amount of work
that is to be done when the personnel is on duty, as well as the level of manning on the tanker. The
workload is closely related to physical or mental capability of the crew member, which may be a result
of all mental and physical tasks the person must perform within a prescribed time. The scheduling of
watchstanding coupled with maintenance and repair activities especially affect the individual crew
member. Any interference with a person's normal sleeping hours, which results in fatigue and
difficulties in sleeping, which again results in fewer hours of sleep. Studies have shown that the effect
of the standard three-watch rotation (4 hours watch, 8 hours off) is a disruption of the crew members'
circadian rhythms [3]. This disruption of the physiological circadian (approximately 24 hour) rhythm
caused by having to be awake and working at unusual hours and sleep during daytime leads to sleep
deprivation, which result in degraded performance [57]. Manning is related to the failure to ensure that
all required tasks aboard the ship can be performed by adequate personnel of proper skill level, ability,
experience, and certification [31].
Formalization
Formalization concerns the existence of well-identified rules, procedures, and standardized methods
for routine activities, as well as unusual occurrences. This includes step-by-step written procedures and
check-lists. Inadequate formalization concerns procedures that are difficult to read, locate,
inconvenient to use, conflicting, inaccurate, inadequate, outdated, or do not provide sufficient detail
[15, 57]. Regarding the availability and quality of procedures, the shipboard environment typically
suffers from lack of procedures rather than lack of adequate procedures [3].
Coordination of Work
Coordination of work is related to planning, division, integration, and implementation of work related
activities among individuals or groups of individuals [15]. The term includes coordination between
bridge officers, between the deck and engine room, with pilots, and with the home office. Roles and
responsibilities should be clearly defined in order to avoid confusion, and similarly, practices regarding
personnel and department work activities should be specified [15]. Coordination of work also includes
task design, which refers to designing tasks that match the ability of the people performing the tasks.
The task requirements must be specified in a way that are not unreasonable, inefficient, impossible,
excessive, or impractical. In addition, tasks should not require extreme levels of complexity,
information load, interpretation, or repetitiveness [57]. Examples of inferior requirements include
excessive watch duration or frequency, requiring a single person to simultaneously monitor displays
spatially separated, or requiring exposure to hazards without proper training, experience, or protective
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gear [31]. The extent to which decision making and authority are localized to one area or among
certain groups of individuals influences the success of the coordination. In emergency situations, for
example, extensive centralization may result in time delays because personnel are unable to make
quick decisions [15]. In addition, the coordination of work MOF involves problem identification,
which concerns the amount of encouragement of personnel by the organization to draw upon
knowledge, experience, and current information to identify problems and solutions [15].
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture refers to the personnel's shared perception of the organization. The
organizational culture includes traditions, values, customs, practices, goals, and socialization processes
that endure over time. The organizational culture distinguishes an organization from others, i.e., it is
the "personality" of the organization [15]. It relates to whether personnel take personal responsibility
for their actions and the consequences of these actions, as well as the degree of commitment or pride in
the organization [15]. The term also refers to the level of understanding, acceptance, or agreement by
the personnel regarding the purpose and relevance of company goals [15].
Benefits
Benefits include the level of pay or salary the different personnel receive, as well as other benefits such
as insurance and retirement programs, and the overall distribution of the company's financial
resources. This term includes actual distribution as well as individual perception of this distribution
[15, 57]. In the case that there are large differences in pay among the crew, the crew members
receiving the lowest salary or benefits may develop unfavorable feelings towards the higher paid crew
members, which results in tensions among the crew. Fair and well-defined policies with respect to
salary and benefits are likely to reduce the negative effects of this factor.
Physical Resources
In order to operate the tanker safely and efficiently, the crew must have adequate equipment and
resources. Physical resources refers to the management of resources which ensure that people have the
tools, equipment, supplies, and facilities to perform the required tasks. This MOF includes the
absence, shortage, inappropriateness, and storage of resources, as well as the difficulty in obtaining the
resources [31].
Quality of Life
Quality of life refers to the standard of living and the overall happiness of the personnel. It includes
the quality and cleanliness of the living quarters and the overall environment, as well as the quality and
variation of food and entertainment. It includes inadequate lighting, heating, cooling, or ventilation
systems, and the degree of general cleanliness [31]. In addition, excessive noise and vibration, which
leads to irritation and fatigue, influences human performance greatly. Cleanliness, which is a
psychological factor, affects how the personnel perceive the organization. In the case that the work
environment is dirty, it signals that the management is indifferent to work performance [57].
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Performance Evaluation
Performance evaluation concerns the degree to which personnel are provided with fair assessments of
their work-related behavior [15]. In the case that fair assessments are provided, the personnel will
most likely strive to perform well and become more involved in the operation. If no assessment is
provided, the personnel may perform at less than optimum levels, because of the perception that their
performance will not be noticed or is unimportant. In the case that the assessment provided is unfair,
the various individuals will likely struggle for a certain time in order to receive the proper feedback;
however, in the absence of this, the individual may eventually give up and rather perform at a
substandard level.
Company Programs
Company programs refers to varying programs related to the overall well-being of the crew. It
includes alcohol and drug programs, fitness programs, health programs, etc. Alcohol and drug
programs are extremely important in order to prevent the consumption of alcoholic beverages and/or
use of narcotics on or too close to duty, as well as excessive drinking or drug use over longer periods
of time. The mental and physical effects due to alcohol and drug use include extreme drowsiness,
false sense of competence, hallucinations, etc. [31, 44]. The fitness and health of the personnel are
also important, and therefore well planned and implemented programs are of great significance.
Personnel Selection
Personnel selection concerns the degree to which personnel are properly identified with the requisite
knowledge, experiences, skills, and abilities to perform a given job [15]. In addition, the individual
differences among the crew members, which may create tension, should be matched as well as
practicable. The individual differences are further amplified when multi-national crews are employed,
and therefore special measures should be implemented in order to increase the level of understanding
with respect to language, culture, etc. Language barriers, cultural differences, and economic
backgrounds all influence the way individuals interact and teams function [1].
Personnel Turnover
Personnel turnover concerns the movement of crew members among various vessels, which results in
crew members operating a vessel with which they have little or no experience. This is especially a
problem among licensed deck officers [44]. (The practice utilizing hiring halls is especially related to
high turnover of onboard personnel; however, this practice is not extensively used in the oil tanker
industry.)
Training Programs
Training programs relate to the quality of the training sessions in which personnel are provided with
the requisite knowledge and skills to perform tasks safely and effectively [15]. In addition to
providing required technical and operational knowledge and skill, training programs are often used to
influence the employees regarding the desired objectives and goals of the organization. In addition to
regular training, drills or emergency simulations are extremely important in maritime operations and
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should therefore be implemented regularly. By conducting the drills frequently, turnover across the
organization does not erase the organizational memory and new responses can be developed for the
changing technologies and environments. All parties involved should be included in the drills in order
for the parties to work out the relationship amongst themselves, before the event of an emergency.
[49].
Supervision
Supervision refers to the level of oversight of activities of the personnel, as well as the degree to which
the personnel are provided on-the-job training. The term includes checking to see that a job is
performed in a timely and correct manner, providing proper resources, and equal treatment of
personnel [31]. The factor of on the-the-job training is especially important with respect to newly
hired personnel. Regardless of their level of education and experience, it takes some time before new
personnel are familiar with the vessel and the organizational environment.
Time Urgency
Time urgency concerns the situation in which personnel perceive schedule pressures while completing
tasks [15]. In order to be cost-effective, the operation will always be associated with a certain degree
of time urgency. However, there are varying levels at which the management pressures the crew to
complete the voyages as fast as possible. In the case that voyage-time becomes more important than
safety and pollution prevention, this factor greatly influences the personnel's ability to perform at an
optimum level.
Organizational Learning
Organizational learning refers to the degree to which the organization uses personnel sufficiently, as
well as knowledge gained from past experience, both from the company itself or the industry, to
improve future performance [15]. For instance, in the case that a company utilizes accident
investigations to determine which factors may lead to accidents and implements the necessary changes,
the company uses past experience to reduce risk in the future.
Communication
The term communication concerns the lines of communication established by the organization. It
includes external, inter-departmental, and intra-departmental communication. External communication
refers to problems in the exchange of information, both formal and informal, between the tanker, its
parent organization, and external organizations [15]. Inter-departmental communication refers to
problems in exchange of information, both formal and informal, between the different departments or
units within the tanker company [15]. Intra-departmental communication refers to problems in the
exchange of information, both formal and informal, within a given department or unit of the tanker
[15], i.e., the bridge team and the engine room team.
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7.3 Ranking of PSFs and MOFs
As discussed in Chapter 5, the PSFs and the MOFs may be ranked according to their relative
importance with respect to specific HEPs associated with the relevant tasks. The PSFs that influence
the performance of an individual in executing the specific task identified in the grounding model and
the MOFs, impacting the various PSFs, are identified and analyzed in Section 7.4. In order to analyze
the impact of these factors' on HEPs, PSFs and MOFs are ranked according to their relative importance
or degree of influence. The rankings are obtained by pairwise comparisons performed by individuals
familiar with the operations of vessels and the AHP method. (The group of experts includes naval
officers with cumulatively 30-45 years of experience.) The questionnaires utilized for the pairwise
comparisons are located in Appendix V. Once the pairwise comparisons are performed, Expert Choice
is utilized to calculate the relative importance of the PSFs and MOFs, and a value function can be
determined relating MOFs to the probability of tanker grounding.
7.3.1 Pairwise Comparison
In order to simplify the pairwise comparison of the PSFs with respect to the HEPs and the MOFs with
respect to the PSFs, it is assumed that the MOFs influencing a specific PSF are the same regardless of
which HEP the PSF influences. Therefore, it is only necessary to do pairwise comparison of the MOFs
for each PSF once. The pairwise comparison scale, shown in Table 7-1, is utilized when comparing
the relative importance of two factors.
Table 7-1: Pairwise Comparison Scale
Verbal Judgment of Importance Numerical Ratings
Extremely important 9
Very important to extremely important 8
Very important 7
Important to very important 6
Important 5
Moderately important to important 4
Moderately important 3
Equally to moderately important 2
Equally important 1
In order to compare the factors, a baseline condition/state and a target condition/state are utilized. The
baseline is characterized as a worst case scenario, within reasonable limits, for each of the factors. The
target is defined as a best case scenario, within reasonable limits. That is, when comparing two PSFs
with respect to a task, the relative importance of the PSFs is determined with respect to the potential
improvement from the worst case to the best case scenario. In this way, the importance of the
improvement of one PSF from the worst case to the best case scenario is ranked with respect to the
importance of the improvement of the other PSF from the worst case to the best case scenario.
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Similarly, the importance of the improvement of one MOF from the worst case to the best case
scenario is ranked with respect to the importance of the improvement of the other MOF from the worst
case to the best case scenario. In order to determine the worst case scenario for each factor, the
operation of a substandard management company operating under a substandard flag is used as a
guideline, while the determination of the best case scenario is based on the operations of an excellent
management company operating under a traditional flag.
7.4 Linking HEPs, PSFs, and MOFs
The following sections discuss the root causes characterized as HEPs determined to have the largest
impact on the probability of tanker grounding. For each of the HEPs, the related PSFs and MOFs are
identified, and the MOFs determined to have the largest influence on human performance are
discussed.
7.4.1 Failure to Initiate and Carry Out Planning Correctly
The human error characterized as failure to initiate and carry out planning correctly, consists of four
different tasks; failure to check publications and notices without error, failure to properly enter the
changes on the charts, failure to determine safe waypoints, and failure to lay down a safe track.
Although the individual HEPs associated with these tasks are different, the PSFs and MOFs
influencing the navigator are assumed to be the similar for all these tasks. Therefore it is only
necessary to perform the pairwise comparison once for the four tasks.
Prior to departure and arrival, the bridge team must ensure that navigational charts reflect the most
current and accurate information, which involves checking various publications and notices [3]. The
actions involved in checking periodicals for changes in the charts are assumed to be similar to the
actions in nuclear power plant operations involving following procedures with no check-off provisions
[57]. The changes must be entered in the charts, which is assumed to be similar to following
procedures with check-off provisions [57], because the mariner usually develops a list of changes to
make. The task of determining waypoints for the passage involves studying the charts to determine the
track of the vessel. It is assumed that determining the waypoints are similar to that of writing down a
procedural item [57]. The task of laying down the track involves plotting the waypoints and
highlighting any hazards to navigation. The process requires precise use of dividers and simple
mathematical calculations, analogous to a reactor technician's use of a micrometer [3]. The actions
involved in plotting the track are therefore assumed to be analogous to those involved in following
procedures with simple arithmetic [57].
The factors which influence the task of initiating and carrying out planning correctly are shown in
Figure 7-1. The PSFs are the factors immediately underneath the HEP, while the MOFs associated
with the PSFs are listed directly underneath the respective PSF. The task of carrying out the planning
of the vessel's track is normally performed under a limited amount of stress, i.e., the situation may be
characterized as relatively relaxed. However, the process can be tedious and time-consuming [3], and
a risk of deferring the task exists.
Based on the pairwise comparisons and the ranking of the influence factors, it was found that the PSF
most important in determining the performance of the crew when initiating and carrying out planning is
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Figure 7-1: Factors Influencing the Task of Initiate and Carry Out Planning
Figure 7-2: Percent Importance of MOFs - Initiating and Carrying Out Planning
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the level of motivation, followed by performance ability, physical condition, and level of attention.
The MOF impacting performance to the greatest extent is workload. Figure 7-2 illustrates the degree
of influence the different aspects of management and the organization have on this HEP. (The
abbreviations used for the MOFs are defined in Appendix VI.)
7.4.2 Failure of Captain to Detect and Correct Errors
The approval process assumes that the captain is involved and takes a hands-on approach in verifying
the validity of the plan [3]. The actions involved in the captain approving the plan are assumed to be
analogous to those involved in a checker's failure to detect errors [57], i.e., hands-on checking.
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Figure 7-3: Factors Influencing the Captain's Ability to Detect and Correct Errors
The factors influencing the captain's ability to detect and correct errors are shown in Figure 7-3. The
captain will most likely have adequate training and experience to perform his/her tasks; however, in the
case that the captain is new to the company or the vessel, this is not necessarily true. The captain has
the ultimate responsibility for the operation of the vessel, and therefore also the safety of the crew as
well as responsibility for preventing an oil spill.
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Similar to the task of initiating and carrying out planning, the PSF most important for determining the
level of performance of the captain is the level of motivation. Following this PSF are the level of
attention, the captain's knowledge of company procedures and standards, the possibility of conflicting
motives, the captain's ability to perform, and physical condition. The MOF having the largest impact
on the task of detecting and correcting errors is the workload. The different MOFs impacts on the
captain are shown in Figure 7-4.
Figure 7-4: Percent Importance of MOFs - Detect and Correct Errors
7.4.3 Failure to Correctly Read Ranges Off Radar
The process of taking a fix typically involves taking at least two radar ranges. The navigator must read
the ranges off the radar, which is presented in a digital format [3]. Hence, the actions involved in
reading the radar ranges are assumed to be analogous to those involved in reading quantitative
information from a digital display [57].
The PSFs and MOFs influencing the individual reading ranges off the radar are shown in Figure 7-5.
As previously discussed, the architectural features of the bridge are important because people tend to
avoid unnecessary effort, which may result in attempting to read the radar from a distance. Based on
the ranking of the specified PSFs, the level of motivation was again found to have the most influence
on performance, followed by ability to perform the task, physical condition, level of attention, and
architectural features. The MOF influencing the individual reading ranges the most is workload; all the
MOFs are shown in Figure 7-6.
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Figure 7-5: Factors Influencing the Task of Reading Ranges Off the Radar
Figure 7-6: Percent Importance of MOFs - Reading Ranges Off the Radar
Impact of Management and Organizational Factors on the Risk of Tanker Grounding
7.4.4 Failure to Correctly Plot Ranges on Chart
The second part of the process of taking a fix involves plotting the ranges correctly on the chart. The
recording of the information obtained involves more than just writing down the information; some skill
is required in using the dividers to plot the ranges to the correct scale [3]. The actions involved in
plotting the ranges are assumed to be similar to those involving error of commission in recording
readings [57].
The factors influencing the task of correctly plotting the ranges on the navigational chart are shown in
Figure 7-7. Two PSFs, the level of motivation and ability to perform, were found to be equally
important PSFs. Following these two factors are level of attention and physical condition. The levels
of impact by the various MOFs are shown in Figure 7-8.
Figure 7-7: Factors Influencing the Task of Plotting the Ranges on the Chart
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Figure 7-8: Percent Importance of MOFs - Plotting Ranges on the Chart
7.4.5 Failure to Detect Difference Error
Once the fix is plotted, the navigator must assess whether or not the vessel is following the desired
track. The actions involved in detecting a difference error between the actual course track and the
planned track are assumed to be similar to those involved in the task of checking readings with limits
[57], where the navigator checks the plotted fix to ensure that it is within tolerable limits within the
planned track.
The PSFs and MOFs influencing whether or not a difference error is detected are shown in Figure 7-9.
The PSFs found to have the largest influence on this task are the level of perception and the level of
attention, both of approximately equal importance. Level of perception was previously defined as the
degree to which the existence of a problem is properly realized or diagnosed, while level of attention
was defined as the level of vigilance regarding tasks assigned. These PSFs are followed by level of
motivation, ability to perform, and physical condition. The levels of impact of the various MOFs on
the task are shown in Figure 7-10.
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Figure 7-9: Factors Influencing the Task of Detecting the Difference Error
Figure 7-10: Percent Importance of MOFs - Detecting Difference Error
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7.4.6 Failure to Order Required Course Change
Given the existence of a difference error, the conning officer must order the correct course change.
This can be as simple as a rudder order, however, the standard order involves both a rudder angle order
and a final course to steady on [3]. The possible errors involved in ordering a course change are
assumed to be nonpassive task errors of commission [57].
The PSFs and MOFs influencing the task of ordering a course change are shown in Figure 7-11. The
PSF found to be the most important for ordering a course change correctly is the level of perception.
Following this PSF are communication or exchange of information, ability to perform, and physical
condition. The MOF most important to the task is communication, i.e., established lines of
communication. The various MOFs influencing the task are shown in Figure 7-12.
Figure 7-11: Factors Influencing the Task of Ordering the Required Course Change
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Figure 7-12: Percent Importance of MOFs - Ordering Required Course Changes
7.4.7 Failure to Respond to Ordered Course Change
Once the order to change course is given, the helm must respond to the order. This involves turning
the wheel while watching the rudder angle indicator and the gyro repeater until the ordered course is
achieved [3]. The actions involved in the helmsman responding to the order are assumed to be a type
of failure to recall two items, or instructions, given orally [57].
The factors important to the successful performance of this task are shown in Figure 7-13. The relative
impacts of the five PSFs, in descending order, are communication/exchange of information, physical
condition, level of attention, level of perception, and ability to perform. Similar to the task of ordering
the course change, the most influential MOF for this task is the established lines of communication.
The different impacts of the MOFs are shown in Figure 7-14.
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Figure 7-13: Factors Influencing the Task of Responding to Ordered Course Change
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Figure 7-14: Percent Importance of MOFs - Responding to Ordered Course Change
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7.4.8 Failure to Drop Anchor in an Emergency Situation
In the event that propulsion or steering abilities are lost, dropping the anchor may prevent the vessel
from drifting into too shallow water. The situation that requires dropping the anchor is very stressful.
The actions that are involved in the situation in which the anchor is considered are assumed to be
similar to those defined for a diagnosis following an abnormal event in the nuclear power industry
[57].
The factors influencing the individuals considering whether or not to drop the anchor are shown in
Figure 7-15. The PSF found to have the largest impact is the factors related to conflicting motives. In
the case that the captain and crew are uncertain about which objectives or goals are most important for
the organization, confusion and indecision are likely results. Following the PSF related to conflicting
motives are exchange of information, level of perception, level of awareness of roles and
responsibilities, ability to perform, and physical condition. The behavior of the decision-maker is in
this situation also affected by the natural environment. In the case of storm or strong winds and
currents, the situation is dramatically more stressful. However, the natural environment, which is a
PSF, is not influenced by MOFs, and therefore this PSF is indifferent to changes in the management or
the organization. However, by utilizing the PSFs that are influenced by MOFs, the most important
factor was found to be the established lines of communication. All the MOFs influencing the mariner
in this situation are shown in Figure 7-16.
Figure 7-15: Factors Influencing the Task of Deciding to Drop Anchor/Request Assistance
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Figure 7-16: Percent Importance of MOFs - Considering Dropping the Anchor
7.4.9 Failure to Request Assistance in an Emergency Situation
In the case that all else fails, assistance is necessary in order to prevent a casualty to occur. As
previously discussed, the failure to request assistance represents one of the largest contributions to an
assistance failure [3]. Once the bridge crew recognizes that assistance is required, the stress level is
extremely high. Similar to the situation in which the anchor is considered, the situation in which
assistance is considered is assumed to be analogous to that considered a diagnosis, following an
abnormal event, in the nuclear power industry [57].
The factors influencing the decision-maker in this situation are equal to those identified for the
situation in which dropping the anchor is considered, which are shown in Figure 7-15. The PSFs, with
respect to relative degree of importance, are level of perception, conflicting motives, exchange of
information, level of awareness of roles and responsibilities, ability to perform, physical condition, and
the natural environment. The MOF having the largest impact on the individual deciding whether to
request assistance or not, is the established lines of communication. All the MOFs influencing the
individual mariner are shown in Figure 7-17.
- -
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Figure 7-17: Percent Importance of MOFs - Considering Requesting Assistance
7.5 Summary of Factors with Greatest Impact
Human performance is greatly influenced by the various PSFs, which serve as intermediate variables
for the MOFs influencing performance. By utilizing AHP, the MOFs of most importance with respect
to the various tasks performed by personnel operating a tanker have been identified. The PSFs having
the greatest impact on each of the different HEPs, identified in the grounding analysis in Chapter 6, are
listed in Table 7-2, together with the MOFs having the largest influence on the different HEPs.
Table 7-2: PSFs and MOFs with Greatest Impact on the Identified HEPs
HEP PSF MOFs
Failure to Initiate and Carry Out Planning Correctly Level of Motivation Workload
Failure of Captain to Detect and Correct Errors Level of Motivation Workload
Failure to Correctly Read Ranges Off Radar Level of Motivation Workload
Failure to Correctly Plot Ranges on Chart Level of Motivation Workload
Failure to Detect Difference Error Level of Perception Workload
Level of Attention
Failure to Order Required Course Change Level of Perception Communication
Failure to Respond to Ordered Course Change Exchange of Information Communication
Failure to Drop Anchor in Emergency Situation Conflicting Motives Communication
Failure to Request Assistance in Emergency Situation Level of Perception Communication
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8 Incorporating MOFs Into the Grounding Model
In order to determine quantitatively which aspects of management and organizations have the largest
impact on grounding, the results presented in Chapter 7 must be incorporated into the grounding model
presented in Chapter 6. By having estimates of the degree to which the different MOFs impacts the
various HEPs, i.e., the rankings of the MOFs, it is possible to calculate the degree to which these
factors impact the probability of grounding. (As discussed in Section 5.4.2, the rankings are
determined by normalizing the eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalues of the ratio matrices
resulting from the pairwise comparisons.) Each HEP varies with respect to how great a role it plays in
determining the grounding probability, and therefore the MOF which seems to be most important,
from only analyzing the HEPs, may not necessarily be the factor that has the largest influence.
8.1 Modification of HEPs
In Table 6-1 and Table 6-2, the mean HEP values were presented with their associated uncertainty
ranges. The HEPs, together with the uncertainty ranges, are utilized to determine the impact of the
MOFs on the probability of grounding. In Chapter 7, the degree of influence that each MOF has on
specific HEPs was determined as a percentage of all the MOFs influencing that specific HEP. As the
different MOFs influencing the HEP vary, the HEPs will vary accordingly. By utilizing the uncertainty
ranges, the amount of variation in each HEP as a result of changes in the various MOFs is determined.
8.1.1 Uncertainty Bounds
The estimates of the mean HEP values are accompanied by uncertainty. This uncertainty is related to
imperfect knowledge, stochasticity, and variability in situations. That is, it includes the random
variability in individuals, presumed uncertainty of the analysis, and variations in PSFs. The PSFs are,
as previously discussed, intermediate variables between the HEPs and the MOFs, and therefore the
uncertainty bounds are utilized in order to obtain an estimate of the degree to which the MOFs
influences the HEPs. The uncertainty bounds include approximately 90 percent of the true HEP for a
given task of activity [57]. The uncertainty bounds are estimates of the spread of the HEPs associated
with a lognormal distribution, i.e., the bounds are symmetrical on a logarithmic scale about the
nominal HEP [57].
8.1.2 Ratings of Organizations
Once the percentages of each MOFs' influence on the different HEPs are estimated, the influence the
different management and organizations have on the MOFs must be incorporated. This is
accomplished by the following value function:
HEP = HEPIow+AHEP-[(0.01- PMOF1 )'RMoF1 + (0.01- PMOF2 )'RMoF2 + (0.01- PMOFx)-RMo]]
AHEP = Uncertainty Range
PMOFx = Percent Importance of MOFx
RMOFx = Rating of MOFx with Respect to Specific Company
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The ratings of a company with respect to the different MOFs are incorporated as R's in the equation.
That is, for each MOF the company is rated with respect to adequacy. The chart utilized when rating a
company is included in Appendix VII, and the ratings with respect to each HEP are demonstrated in
Appendix VIII. For simplicity, as well as due to the fact that the uncertainty bounds are symmetric on
a logarithmic scale which complicates the calculations, the ratings are limited to inadequate, adequate,
and excellent. A value of 1 is used for a rating of inadequate, while a value of 0 is used for a rating of
excellent. For a rating of adequate, the value depends on the uncertainty range, and is determined
separately for each HEP, as illustrated in Appendix VIII.
8.2 Modification of the Probability of Grounding
As already mentioned, the influence of the MOFs on the probability of grounding may be estimated
through their influence on the HEP values. By incorporating the modified HEP values into the
equation for the probability of grounding, the probability reflects the conditions of a specific
management company operating a tanker. In addition, by performing sensitivity analysis, the MOFs
influencing the probability of grounding to the largest extent are determined.
In order to incorporate the MOFs into the grounding probability equation, the modified HEP values,
including the percentage MOF values and the company ranking values, are substituted for the mean
HEPs. In this manner, the probability of grounding increases in the case that a MOF, having an impact
on HEPs important to the determination of the probability of grounding, is rated unfavorably.
Similarly, the same MOF will decrease the probability of grounding if rated favorably.
In addition to the MOFs identified, human behavior, and therefore the probability of grounding, is
influenced by various degrees of stress. Stress results in physical or psychological tension [57], which
influences the performance of the crew. Stress is implicitly included in the analysis. If stress needs to
be included more explicitly, it is easily incorporated in the analysis as discussed in Section 2.2.
8.3 Results of Modified Grounding Model
The MOFs determined to have the largest influences on the probability of grounding are workload,
organizational culture, quality of life, and formalization. Workload, which considers the number of
work hours, breaks, and overall amount of work, affects the physical and mental capabilities of the
crew, and therefore affects their performance to a great extent. Organizational culture is related to the
crew's perception of the organization. Quality of life refers to the standard of living, working
environment, and the overall well-being of the crew. Formalization considers the quality of procedures
and standardized methods.
The MOFs which have the largest impact on the powered grounding portion of the probability of
grounding are the same as those important to the total probability of grounding. This is due to the fact
that powered grounding represents the largest contribution to the probability of grounding. The MOFs
which have the largest impact on the drift grounding portion of the probability of grounding are
established lines of communication, organizational culture, formalization, and training programs.
Established lines of communication refers to the extent to which well-identified paths for
communication, or exchange of information, exist. Organizational culture refers to, as described
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above, the perception of the organization, while formalization refers to the quality of standard task
procedures. Training programs refer to the quantity and quality of crew training. The factors
determined to have the largest impact on grounding are summarized in Table 8-1.
Table 8-1: MOFs Having the Largest Impact on Tanker Grounding
TOTAL GROUNDING Powered Grounding Drift Grounding
Workload Workload Communication
Organizational Culture Organizational Culture Organizational Culture
Quality of Life Quality of Life Formalization
Formalization Formalization Training Programs
It is interesting to examine the resulting probability of grounding over the full range of MOF ratings.
In Appendix IX, it is shown that the probability of grounding, for a company for which all MOFs are
rated excellent, is 6.79-10 6. This represents a great improvement compared to a company rated
inadequate, which has a probability of grounding of 1.5110 -3. Similarly, it is an improvement
compared to a company rated adequate, which has a probability of grounding of 1.04-10 4 .
8.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analyses are performed in order to determine the variation in the probability of grounding as
a result of varying the MOF ratings. Table 8-2 shows the percentage reduction in the probability of
total, powered, and drift grounding, as each MOF is improved from inadequate to excellent, keeping
the other MOF variables as inadequate. Table 8-3 shows the percentage increase in the probability of
total, powered, and drift grounding as each MOF is improved from adequate to excellent, keeping the
other MOFs as adequate.
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Table 8-2: Percent Decrease in the Probability of Grounding Due to Improvements in Each
MOF from Inadequate to Excellent
MOFs Total Grounding Powered Grounding Drift Grounding
Benefits 9.76 10.16 2.79
Communication 2.02 0.36 31.28
Coordination of Work 6.06 5.63 13.75
Organizational Culture 23.88 23.76 25.89
Performance Evaluation 11.26 11.58 5.55
Formalization 18.71 18.37 24.66
Organizational Learning 0.01 0.01 0
Company Programs 7.93 7.81 10.01
Quality of Life 20.08 20.93 5.00
Physical Resources 6.00 6.34 - 0
Personnel Selection 10.84 11.12 5.99
Supervision 5.00 5.11 2.94
Training Programs 8.24 7.60 19.46
Turnover 11.25 11.34 9.65
Time Urgency 2.81 2.37 10.54
Workload 32.27 33.37 12.89
Table 8-3: Percent Decrease in the Probability of Grounding Due to Improvements in Each
MOF from Adequate to Excellent
MOFs Total Grounding Powered Grounding Drift Grounding
Benefits 7.68 7.99 2.21
Communication 1.60 0.27 25.17
Coordination of Work 4.85 4.51 10.94
Organizational Culture 19.23 19.14 20.76
Performance Evaluation 8.84 9.09 4.39
Formalization 18.34 15.08 19.76
Organizational Learning 0.01 0.01 - 0
Company Programs 6.18 6.08 7.95
Quality of Life 15.81 16.49 3.95
Physical Resources 4.69 4.95 - 0
Personnel Selection 8.42 8.63 4.75
Supervision 3.89 3.98 2.33
Training Programs 6.59 6.08 15.54
Turnover 9.02 9.09 7.66
Time Urgency 2.32 1.98 8.37
Workload 25.93 26.82 10.25
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8.5 Comparison with Factors Emphasized by the ISM
Code
The MOFs emphasized by the ISM Code, discussed in Section 4.3, are summarized in Table 8-4,
together with the MOFs found to have the largest impact on the probability of grounding. The MOFs
emphasized by the ISM Code are listed in an arbitrarily order, while the factors resulting from the
grounding analysis are listed in order of importance.
Table 8-4: Factors Emphasized by ISM Code vs. Factors Resulting from Grounding Analysis
ISM Code Grounding Analysis
Safety Culture Workload
Organizational Culture Organizational Culture
Organizational Learning Quality of Life
Formalization Formalization
Coordination of Work Performance Evaluation
Communication Turnover
Personnel Selection Personnel Selection
Training Programs Benefits
Training Programs
As seen from Table 8-4, the factors that match are culture, formalization, personnel selection, and
training programs. The ISM Code addresses both organizational culture and safety culture. In the
grounding analysis, safety culture is assumed to influence all other variables, and therefore is removed
from the analysis. However, due to the assumption that safety culture has an impact on all the MOFs,
its importance is clearly seen. Organizational culture, which clearly represents a match, was
determined to be the second largest influence on the probability of grounding. Similarly,
formalization, which concerns the quality of procedures and standards, personnel selection, and
training programs are of importance both in the ISM Code and to the probability of grounding.
The MOFs representing important factors to the grounding analysis that do not match the factors
emphasized by the ISM Code are workload, quality of life, performance evaluation, turnover, and
benefits. Workload, determined to have the greatest impact on the probability of grounding, is not
specifically addressed in the ISM Code. This might be due to the fact that safety culture has a large
influence on this factor and also that this factor is addressed in other regulations, e.g., the STCW
Convention. Similarly, quality of life, performance evaluation, turnover, and benefits are not explicitly
emphasized by the ISM Code. The reason for this might be that these factors are addressed in
regulations more specifically related to issues concerning crew members. However, another reason
might be that these factors are not satisfactorily considered in the ISM Code, and therefore these
factors require further investigation.
Factors emphasized by the ISM Code that were determined to be of lesser importance in the grounding
analysis are organizational learning, coordination of work, and communication. Organizational
learning, which certainly would seem to be of great importance, needs to be investigated further with
respect to the probability of grounding. It is a possibility that this factor influences a larger number of
PSFs, and therefore HEPs, than what was considered in the grounding analysis. Coordination of work
and communication were found to be of importance to the probability of drift grounding. However,
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due to the fact that drift grounding represents a fairly small portion of the total probability of
grounding, these factors are less important to the probability of grounding.
The ISM Code is valid for a variety of types of vessels, including passenger ships and mobile offshore
platforms, and therefore the issues emphasized by the ISM Code may differ slightly from those
specific to oil tankers. However, the majority of the MOFs determined to be of importance for one
type of vessel should apply to most of other types of vessels. This because the tasks involved in
passage planning, piloting, and emergency situations are very similar.
Relative importance with respect to the different management and organizational aspects of ship
operators is not explicitly stated in the ISM Code. Therefore, the code does not provide any guidelines
as to which areas should be emphasized to the greatest extent. In order to be certified, a company must
meet certain requirements; however, in the case that the company decides to exceed the requirements,
the ISM Code does not provide any assistance in determining which MOF would result in the most
benefit, due to an improvement. The model developed for tanker grounding provides new insight, and
it represents an important framework for developing investment and operational strategies.
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9 Conclusion
The operation of oil tankers represents a risk to the environment due to the severe consequences of oil
spills. Tankers are the largest contributor by vessel type to worldwide spill volume. One of the
largest causes of accidents involving oil tankers is the event of grounding. The probability of
grounding is largely influenced by the performance of the individuals responsible for the operation of
the tanker. Therefore, in order to reduce the risk of grounding, the factors having an impact on the
performance of humans must be addressed.
As discussed, individuals are influenced by both internal and external factors. The various PSFs
determine whether an individual's performance is highly reliable, reliable, or unreliable. The PSFs
serve as intermediate variables between the HEPs for various tasks and the different MOFs. By
determining the relative influence of the MOFs on the PSFs, estimates of the impact of the different
MOFs on human performance are obtained.
The MOFs determined to have the greatest impact on the probability of grounding are workload,
organizational culture, quality of life, and formalization. Workload refers to the amount of overall
work that must be done by the crew, organizational culture concerns the overall perception of the
organization by the crew, quality of life refers to the standard of the living and working environment,
while formalization refers to the extent to which well-identified procedures and standards are
developed. The factors found to have the largest influence on powered grounding are the same as
those for total grounding. The MOFs most important to drift grounding are established lines of
communication, organizational culture, formalization, and training programs. Safety culture is
assumed to influence all other MOFs, and therefore this factor is naturally one of the factors with
greatest impact on the probability of grounding.
The primary purpose of this analysis was to develop and demonstrate the methodology enabling the
inclusion of MOFs into risk analyses, and therefore the results are limited. In order to improve the
results related to the impacts of management and organizations, a greater number of experts should
perform the pairwise comparison. Even though the process of performing pairwise comparison is
tedious and time-consuming, and requires some familiarity with the AHP method, it is an important
method for estimating relative importance. By receiving feedback from the experts doing the
comparisons, the framework and the questionnaires may be improved. The improved questionnaires
may then be redistributed to experts for additional and improved pairwise comparison.
Areas of improvement of the grounding analysis include further development of the drift grounding
portion of the grounding fault tree. A more detailed study utilizing event trees may result in more
accurate estimates compared to the estimates utilized for this analysis. In addition to developing the
analysis with respect to grounding, the analysis should be extended to the event of collision involving
oil tankers.
The framework developed, or an improved version of this framework, may be used to determine which
aspects of a company need the greatest emphasis. It may be utilized to develop and maintain
philosophies related to design and operation, and function as a tool for developing investment
strategies. In addition, the results may be utilized and integrated into the formulation of legislation
and regulation.
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Appendix I
NUREG 1278 Performance Shaping Factors [57]
Situation al Characteristics
Job and Task Instructions
Task and Equipment
Characteristics
Psychological Stressors
Physiological Stressors
Architectural features
Quality of Environment
Work hours/Breaks
Availability/Adequacy of equipment
Manning parameters
Shift rotations
Actions by supervisors
Rewards, recognition, benefits
Procedures required
Written or oral communication
Cautions and warnings
Work methods
Perceptual requirements
Speed, strength, precision requirements
Control-Display relationship
Anticipatory requirements
Interpretation required
Decision-making
Complexity
Narrowness of task
Frequency and repetitiveness
Task criticality
Long and short term memory
Calculation requirements
Feedback
Dynamic vs. step-by-step activities
Team structure and communication
Man-machine interface factors
Suddenness of onset
Duration of stress
Task speed and load
High jeopardy risk
Threats of failure
Monotony
Long, uneventful vigilance periods
Conflicts of motives about job performance
Reinforcement absent of negative
Sensory deprivations
Distractions
Inconsistent cueing
Duration of stress
Fatigue
Pain or discomfort
Hunger or thirst
Temperature extremes
Oxygen insufficiency
Vibration
Movement constriction
Lack of physical exercise
Disruption of circadian rhythm
External
Stressors
- I
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Internal Organismic Factors Training/Experience
Proficiency
Personality/Intelligence variables
Motivation/Attitude
Knowledge of required perfomnnance standards
Emotional states
Physical condition
Attitudes based on outside influences
Group identification
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Appendix II
Definitions of Organizational Factors [59]
1 Decision Making
Centralization
Goal
Prioritization
Organizational
Learning
Problem
Identification
Resource
Allocation
The extent to which decision making and authority are localized to one area or among certain
groups.
The extent to which personnel understand, accept, and agree with the purpose and relevance of
company goals.
The extent to which personnel and organization use knowledge gained from past experience,
from the particular company or the industry, to improve future performance.
The extent to which organizations encourage personnel to draw upon knowledge, experience,
and current information to identify problem.
The extent to which the company distributes financial resources, including actual distribution
well as individual perception of this distribution.
Communication
External The existence of problems in exchange of information, both formal and informal, between the
tanker, its parent organization, and external organizations.
Inter- The existence of problems in exchange of information, both formal and informal, between the
Departmental different departments or units within the tanker company.
Intra- The existence of problems in the exchange of information, both formal and informal, within a
Departmental given department or unit of the plant.
Human Resource Allocation
Performance The degree to which personnel are provided fair assessments of their work-related behavior.
Evaluation
Personnel The degree to which personnel are identified with the requisite knowledge, experiences, skills,
Selection and abilities to perform a given job.
Technical The depth and breadth of requisite understanding to which personnel have regarding design
Knowledge and systems, including phenomena and events that bear on safety.
Training The degree to which personnel are provided with the requisite knowledge and skills to perform
tasks safely and effectively.
Adminitrativ Knowledge
Coordination The existence of problems with planning, integration, and implementation of work activities
of Work among individuals or groups.
Formalization The existence of well-identified rules, procedures, and standardized methods for routine
activities as well as unusual occurrences.
Organizational The understanding of personnel regarding the interactions of organizational subsystems and the
Knowledge way in which work is actually accomplished.
Roles- The degree to which personnel and department work activities are clearly defined and carried
Responsibility out.
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Culture
Organizational
Culture
Ownership
Safety Culture
Time Urgency
The personnel's shared perception of the organization. Includes traditions, values, customs,
practices, goals, and socialization processes that endure over time and that distinguishes an
organization from others. (The "personality" of the organization.)
The degree to which personnel take personal responsibility for actions and the consequences
of these actions. The existence of a commitment to pride in the organization.
The characteristics of the work environment, such as the norms, rules, and common
understandings, that influence personnel's perception of the importance the organization places
on safety. Includes the degree to which a critical, questioning attitude directed toward
improvement exists.
The degree to which plant personnel perceive schedule pressures while completing tasks.
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Appendix III
Calculations for the Probability of Grounding
Powered Grounding
Passage Planning
PProducingFaultyPlan = 1'[PPublicationsAfftPlan(l-PheckPub)'(lPPlot)'(lPWaypoints)(PLayTrack)
+(1'PPubicationwAffe tPn)'( 1-PWaypoints)'(l PLayTrack)
= 1-[0.1- (1-0.003)- (1-0.001)- (1-0.003). (1-0.01) + (1-0.1)- (1-0.003)- (1-0.01)]
= 1.336- 10-2
PErrorsMadelnPlanning = PProducingFaultyPlan" PRecognizeFaultyTrack PCaptainVerify
= 1.336- 10-2 -0.002- 0.01
=2.673- 10 -7
PPlannedTrackUnsafe = (PlncorrectPlanningInformation + PErrorMadeInPlanning" PIntctHazard) PNotDiscovered
= (4.58- 104 + 2.673- 10 0.5)- 0.01
= 4.581- 106
Piloting
PFixNotCorrect = (Psensor + PMeasurement +PPlotFix) Pcaptain
= (9.5.10 4 + 0.001 + 0.001)- 0.01
= 2.95.10 -5
PDifferenceErrorNotDetectedByMeasurement = (PMateFailsToDetectPCaptainFailsToDect) + PFixNotCorrect
= (0.001- 0.01) + 2.95-10-
= 3.95-10-5
PDifferenccErrorNotDetctedVisually = PIndication + PVisibility +(PLookoutPMate'Paptain)
= 0.5 + 0.25 + (0.001)3
= 0.750
PDifferenceErrorNotDetected = PDifferenceErrorNotDetectedByMeasurement' PDifferenceErrorNotDetectedVisually
= 3.95-10-5 - 0.750
= 2.963- 10-5
PInsuficientAction PCaptainFailsToCorrcct (POrder + PResponse)
= 0.01- (0.003+0.003)
= 6.0-10 -s
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PPilotingError = PDifferenceErrorNotDetected + PInsufficientAction
= 2.963- 10-5 + 6.0- 10-5
= 8.963- 10-5
EpiotingErrorRate = 8.963- 10-' )AveragFixRatc
= 8.963- 10-'  (1/3)
= 2.988- 10' errors/min
PCourseDeviatesFromPlan-StraightTrack = POutsideChannel PErrorWhenOutsideChannel
= 0.023- (1-e -EPilotingErrorRatT(OutOfChanne )
= 0.023- (1-e -(0.00002988" 7.108))
= 4.884- 106
PNoFix-LeftTur =e -XAverageFixRate - T(UtilOutsideChannel-LeftTurn)
e -(1/3)(8.089/60)
= 0.956
PNoFix-RightTum = e -AverageFixRate -T(UntilOutsideChannel-RightTum)
= e -(1/3)-(24.267/60)
= 0.874
PCoursDeviatesFromPlan-Tumrn = '[ PFailToTurn PCaptainFailsToDetectFailure"NoFixLefTu Number eftT
S[1-PFailToTum" PCaptainFailsToDetectFailureNo Fx-RghtTumNumberOfRightTums
= 1-[1- 0.001- 0.01- 0.956]o " [1- 0.001- 0.01-0.874]'0
= 1.830 - 10'
PCourseDeviatesFromSafeDesiredTrack = (PCourseDeviatesFromPlan-StraightTrack + PCourseDeviatesFromPlan-Turn) PIntersectsHazard
= (4.884 -10 -6 + 1.830 .10 ) . 0.5
=9.394 -10 -
PPoweredGrounding = PPlannedTrackUnsafe + PCourseDeviatesFromSafeDesiredTrack
= 4.581- 10-6 + 9.394- 10-'
= 9.852- 10-'
Drift Grounding
PAdverseEnvironmentalondijtons = 0.25
PLostWay = 1 e -TotalTransitTime Drift
=l-e -TotalTransitTime -AccidentQuotient • VesselSpeed
= 1 - e -5.214 -0.0000045 - 13.8094 , VesselSpeed =12 knot = 13.8094 mph
= 3.240- 10 -4
PAnchorFailure = 0.25
PAssistanccFailur = 0.25
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PDrift&rounding = PAdversEnvironmntalCondiions PLostWay PAnchorFailuref PAssistanceFailure
= 0.25 - 3.240- 10" - 0.25 " 0.25
= 5.063- I06
Total Probability of Grounding
PGrounding = PPoweredGrounding + PDritGrounding
= 9.852- 10-5 + 5.063- 10 6
= 1.0358- 104
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Appendix IV
Additional Definitions of PSFs and MOFs
The following PSFs and MOFs, even though important in some cases, are considered to have less of an
impact on the specific human errors/tasks identified in the grounding analysis. In the case that some of
the PSFs or MOFs identified here are found to be important to the grounding analysis, these factors
may be added to the pairwise comparison.
Definitions of PSFs
Emotions
Emotions refer to a state of agitation or disturbance which may reduce the normal ability to perform
the required task. This may be caused by interpersonal conflicts or personal problems such as death or
illness in the family, relationship problems, etc. [31].
Panic
The term panic refers to a sudden overpowering fear which may result in degraded performance. This
fear may be caused by an emergency situation, weather conditions, etc. [31].
Anxiety
Anxiety refers to a state of uneasiness and distress about future uncertainties. This state may be caused
by an emergency situation, a situation in which the individual faces the possibility of losing the job,
etc. [31].
Lack of Self-Discipline
Lack of self-discipline refers to an inadequate ability of an individual to control personal conduct.
Examples of this include loss of temper, or other types of unprofessional conduct [31].
Injury
Injury refers the physical damage to the body in which the pain causes loss of physical and mental
abilities [31]. Examples of this include head injury, injured fingers, severe bums, etc.
Physical Illness
Physical illness refers to sickness which decreases the normal ability to perform. Examples of physical
illness include colds and flu, hallucinations due to fever, headaches, seasickness, exposure to toxic
substances, etc. [31].
Mental Impairment
Mental impairment involves diminished mental ability which reduces the ability to perform the mental
part of a task [31].
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Mental Illness
Mental illness concerns psychotic behavior, depression, hallucinations, or other forms of abnormal
behavior [3 1].
Deliberate Misaction
Deliberate misaction includes purposely taking incorrect action or failing to take correct action.
Examples of deliberate misaction include dereliction of duty, refusal to obey commands, etc. [31].
Poor Operations
Poor operations refer to the situation in which individuals or group of individuals degrade the
shipboard environment in such a way that the performance of some tasks is difficult. Examples of this
include ship maneuvers which result in balance and restraint difficulties, or personnel performing tasks
which interfere with those performing other tasks [31].
Poor Maintenance
Poor maintenance concerns the failure to keep any part of ship or equipment in the condition it was
design to function within a design's operation period [31]. This includes inadequate replacement parts
and tools to perform proper maintenance.
Low Morale
Low morale relates to the problem with groups of individuals as shown by reduced willingness,
confidence, or discipline to perform assigned duties. Low morale may be due to interpersonal
conflicts amongst the crew, officers with poor interpersonal skills, lack of a strong corporate or
shipboard safety culture, or excessively long hours of duty [31].
Definitions of MOFs
Discipline
Discipline refers to the failure to ensure that personnel submit to authority, regulations, and procedures.
This includes tolerating unqualified personnel, not enforcing regulations and procedures, or tolerating
inappropriate insubordination [31].
Organizational Knowledge
Organizational knowledge applies to the lack of understanding regarding the interactions of
organizational subsystems and the way in which work is actually accomplished [15].
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Appendix V
Questionnaires Utilized for Pairwise Comparisons
I- -
Failure to Initiate and Carry Out Planning Correctly
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motivati
2 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
3 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
4 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
5 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
6 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure to Initiate and Carry Out Planning Correctly
Inattent Inattention
Motivati Lack of Motivation
Physical Poor Physical Condition (Fatigue, poor fitness, etc.)
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
Inattention
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Workload 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Formaliz
2 Workload 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Coordina
3 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Coordina
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Inattention
Workload Workload (Work hours/breaks, manning, etc.)
Formaliz Formalization
Coordina Coordination of Work
------
Lack of Motivation
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Workload
2 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Benefits
3 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Resource
4 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Quality
5 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
6 Workload 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Benefits
7 Workload 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Resource
8 Workload 9 8 7 6 54 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Quality
9 Workload 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
10 Benefits 9 8 7 6 514 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Resource
11 Benefits 9 8 7.6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Quality
12 Benefits 9 8 7'6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3,4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
13 Resource 9 8 716 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 516 7 8 9 Quality
14 Resource 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
15 Quality 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Lack of Motivation
Culture Organizational Culture
Workload Workload (Work hours/breaks, manning, etc.)
Benefits Benefits such as salary, insurance and retirement plans, etc.
Resource Physical Resources
Quality Quality of Life (Living quarters, food, entertainment, etc.)
Evaluati Performance Evaluation
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Poor Physical Condition
1=EQUAL
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
Node: 0
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Poor Physical Condition
Workload Workload (Work hours/breaks, manning, etc.)
Quality Quality of Life (Living quarters, food, entertainment, etc.)
Programs Company Programs (Alcohol/drug, fitness, health, etc.)
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Poor Performance Ability
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Selectio 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
2 Selectio 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
3 Selectio 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Supervis
4 Selectio 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
5 Turnover 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
6 Turnover 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Supervis
7 Turnover 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
8 Training 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Supervis
9 Training 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
10 Supervis 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Poor Performance Ability
Selectio Personnel Selection
Turnover Personnel Turnover
Training Training Process
Supervis Supervision
Evaluati Performance Evaluation
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Failure of Captain to Detect and Correct Errors
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motivati
2 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
3 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
4 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Proced
5 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motives
6 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
7 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
8 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 312 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Proced
9 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motives
10 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
11 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Proced
12 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motives
13 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Proced
14 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motives
15 Proced 9 8 7 6 5' 4 3 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motives
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure of Captain to Detect and Correct Errors
Inattent Inattention
Motivati Lack of Motivation
Physical Poor Physical Condition (Fatigue, poor fitness, etc.)
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
Proced Inadequate Knowledge of Procedures, Standards, and Regulations
Motives Conflicting Motives Regarding Performance
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Inadequate Knowledge of Procedures, Standards, and Regulations
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Formaliz
2 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
3 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
4 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
5 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
6 Training 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Inadequate Knowledge of Procedures, Standards, and Regulations
Culture Organizational Culture
Formaliz Formalization
Training Training Process
Turnover Personnel Turnover
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Conflicting Motives Regarding Performance
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Urgency
2 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Formaliz
3 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Benefits
4 Culture 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
5 Urgency 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Formaliz
6 Urgency 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Benefits
7 Urgency 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
8 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Benefits
9 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
10 Benefits 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Conflicting Motives Regarding Performance
Culture Organizational Culture
Urgency Time Urgency
Formaliz Formalization
Benefits Benefits such as salary, insurance and retirement plans, etc.
Evaluati Performance Evaluation
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Failure to Correctly Read Ranges Off Radar
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motivati
2 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
3 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
4 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Architec
5 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
6 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
7 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Architec
8 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
9 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Architec
10 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Architec
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure to Correctly Read Ranges Off Radar
Inattent Inattention
Motivati Lack of Motivation
Physical Poor Physical Condition (Fatigue, poor fitness, etc.)
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
Architec Poor Architectural Features
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Poor Architectural Features
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Resource 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Learning
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Poor Architectural Features
Resource Physical Resources
Learning Organizational Learning
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Failure to Correctly Plot Ranges on Chart
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motivati
2 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
3 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
4 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
5 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
6 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure to Correctly Plot Ranges on Chart
Inattent Inattention
Motivati Lack of Motivation
Physical Poor Physical Condition (Fatigue, poor fitness, etc.)
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
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Failure to Detect Difference Error
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motivati
2 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
3 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
4 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
5 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
6 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
7 Motivati 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
8 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
9 Physical 9 8 716 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
10 Ability 98 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure to Detect Difference Error
Inattent Inattention
Motivati Lack of Motivation
Physical Poor Physical Condition (Fatigue, poor fitness, etc.)
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
Percept Lack of Perception or Inadequate Situational Awareness
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Lack of Perception or Inadequate Situational Awareness
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Com
2 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Workload
3 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
4 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
5 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Programs
6 Com 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Workload
7 Com 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
8 Com 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
9 Com 9 8 7 6 514 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Programs
10 Workload 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
11 Workload 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
12 Workload 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Programs
13 Training 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
14 Training 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9' Programs
15 Turnover 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Programs
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Lack of Perception or Inadequate Situational Awareness
Coordina Coordination of Work
Com Established Lines of Communication
Workload Workload (Work hours/breaks, manning, etc.)
Training Training Process
Turnover Personnel Turnover
Programs Company Programs (Alcohol/drug, fitness, health, etc.)
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Failure to Order Required Course Change
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
2 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
3 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
4 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
5 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
6 Percept 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure to Order Required Course Change
Physical Poor Physical Condition (Fatigue, poor fitness, etc.)
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
Percept Lack of Perception or Inadequate Situational Awareness
Communic Inadequate Exchange of Information
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Communication - Inadequate Exchange of Information
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Com 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Coordina
2 Com 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Formaliz
3 Com 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
4 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Formaliz
5 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
6 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Communication - Inadequate Exchange of Information
Com Established Lines of Communication
Coordina Coordination of work
Formaliz Formalization
Training Training Process
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Failure to Respond to Ordered Course Change
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Physical
2 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
3 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
4 Inattent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
5 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
6 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
7 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
8 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
9 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
10 Percept 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure to Respond to Ordered Course Change
Inattent Inattention
Physical Poor Physical Condition (Fatigue, poor fitness, etc.)
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
Percept Lack of Perception or Inadequate Situational Awareness
Communic Inadequate Exchange of Information
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Failure to Drop Anchor in Emergency Situation
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ability
2 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motives
3 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
4 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
5 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Responsi
6 Physical 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Environm
7 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Motives
8 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
9 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
10 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Responsi
11 Ability 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 i4 5 6 7 8 9 Environm
12 Motives 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Percept
13 Motives 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
14 Motives 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 34 5 6 7 8 9 Responsi
15 Motives 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Environm
16 Percept 9 8 7 6,5 4 3 2 1 2 314 5 6 7 8 9 Communic
17 Percept 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Responsi
18 Percept 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Environm
19 Communic 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Responsi
20 Communic 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Environm
21 Responsi 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Environm
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure to Drop Anchor in Emergency Situation
Physical Poor Physical Condition (Fatigue, poor fitness, etc.)
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
Motives Conflicting Motives Regarding Performance
Percept Lack of Perception or Inadequate Situational Awareness
Communic Inadequate Exchange of Information
Responsi
Environm
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Unawareness of Responsibilities
Hazardous Natural Environment (Weather, shallow water, etc.)
Unawareness of Responsibilities
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Formaliz
2 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Com
3 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
4 Coordina 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
5 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Com
6 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
7 Formaliz 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
8 Corn 9 8 716 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
9 Com 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
10 Training 9 8 76 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 Turnover
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Unawareness of Responsibilities
Coordina Coordination of Work
Formaliz Formalization
Com Established Lines of Communication
Training Training Process
Turnover Personnel Turnover
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Failure to Request Assistance in Emergency Situation
Node: 20000
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to: Ability < GOAL
1=EQUAL 3=MODERATE 5=STRONG 7=VERY STRONG 9=EXTREME
1 Selectio 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Turnover
2 Selectio 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
3 Selectio 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Supervis
4 Selectio 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
5 Turnover 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Training
6 Turnover 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Supervis
7 Turnover 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
8 Training 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Supervis
9 Training 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
10 Supervis 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Evaluati
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Failure to Request Assistance in Emergency Situation
Ability Poor Performance Ability (Training, experience, and aptitude)
Selectio Personnel Selection
Turnover Personnel Turnover
Training Training Process
Supervis Supervision
Evaluati Performance Evaluation
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Appendix VI
Abbreviations used for the MOFs
Abbreviation Definition
Benefits Benefits
Com Communication
Coordination Coordination of Work
Culture Organizational Culture
Evaluation Performance Evaluation
Formalization Formalization
Learning Organizational Learning
Programs Company Programs
Resources Physical Resources
Selection Personnel Selection
Supervision Supervision
Training Training Programs
Turnover Turnover
Urgency Time Urgency
Workload Workload
Quality Quality of Life
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Appendix VII
Company Rating
Rate each factor with respect to the company by crossing off in the appropriate box
MOFI: Benefits
MOF2: Communication
MOF3: Coordination
MOF4: Culture
MOF5: Evaluation
MOF6: Formalization
MOF7: Learning
MOF8: Programs
MOF9: Quality
MOF10: Resources
MOF11: Selection
MOF12: Supervision
MOF13: Training
MOF14: Turnover
MOF15: Urgency
MOF16: Workload
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Appendix VIII
Assigning of Rating Values
In the case that a factor is rated inadequate, the value of I should be assigned.
In the case that a factor is rated excellent, the value of 0 should be assigned.
In the case that a factor is rated adequate, the value specified for each HEP should
be assigned.
HEPI: Procedures with no check-off provisions
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.250, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.008 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0660 0
MOF3 0.0223 0
MOF4 0.1243 0
MOF5 0.0787 0
MOF6 0.0400 0
MOF8 0.0550 0
MOF9 0.1497 0
MOFIO 0.0443 0
MOF11 0.0860 0
MOF12 0.0363 0
MOF13 0.0337 0
MOF14 0.0517 0
MOF16 0.2120 0
Modified HEPI: 0.0010
HEP2: Procedures with check-off provisions
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.259, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.0027 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0660 0
MOF3 0.0223 0
MOF4 0.1243 0
MOF5 0.0787 0
MOF6 0.0400 0
MOF8 0.0550 0
MOF9 0.1497 0
MOFO1 0.0443 0
MOF11 0.0860 0
MOF12 0.0363 0
MOF13 0.0337 0
MOF14 0.0517 0
MOF16 0.2120 0
MoifediP2 ,,03
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HEP3: Writing procedural item
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.167, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.0144 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0660 0
MOF3 0.0223 0
MOF4 0.1243 0
MOF5 0.0787 0
MOF6 0.0400 0
MOF8 0. 0550 0
MOF9 0.1497 0
MOF10O 0.0443 0
MOF11 0.0860 0
MOFI2 0.0363 0
MOF13 0.0337 0
MOF14 0.0517 0
MOF16 0.2120 0
Modified HEP3: 0.0006
HEP4: Writing procedural item with arithmetric
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.259, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.027 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0660 0
MOF3 0.0223 0
MOF4 0.1243 0
MOF5 0.0787 0
MOF6 0.0400 0
MOF8 0.0550 0
MOF9 0.1497 0
MOF1O 0.0443 0
MOF11 0.0860 0
MOF12 0.0363 0
MOF13 0.0337 0
MOF14 0.0517 0
MOF16 0.2120 0
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HEP5: Check chart recorder with limits
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.245, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.0053 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0490 0
MOF3 0.0373 0
MOF4 0.1517 0
MOF5 0.0530 0
MOF6 0.1590 0
MOF8 0.0313 0
MOF9 0.0940 0
MOFIO 0.0270 0
MOF11 0.0403 0
MOF12 0.0207 0
MOF13 0.0483 0
MOF14 0.0740 0
MOF15 0.0247 0
MOF16 0.1890 0
Modified HEP5: 0.0007
HEP6: Hands-on type checking
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.167, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.048 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0490 0
MOF3 0.0373 0
MOF4 0.1517 0
MOF5 0.0530 0
MOF6 0.1590 0
MOF8 0.0313 0
MOF9 0.0940 0
MOF10 0.0270 0
MOF11 0.0403 0
MOF12 0.0207 0
MOF13 0.0483 0
MOF14 0.0740 0
MOF15 0.0247 0
MOF16 0.1890 0
Modified HEP6: 0.0020
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HEP7: Reading a digital display
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.259, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.0027 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0483 0
MOF3 0.0270 0
MOF4 0.0750 0
MOF5 0.0567 0
MOF6 0.0483 0
MOF7 0.0640 0
MOF8 0.0657 0
MOF9 0.1560 0
MOF10 0.1027 0
MOF11 0.0877 0
MOF12 0.0503 0
MOF13 0.0353 0
MOF14 0.0260 0
MOF16 0.1573 0
Modified HEP7: 0.0003
HEP8: Record readings
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.259, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.0027 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0617 0
MOF3 0.0253 0
MOF4 0.0923 0
MOF5 0.0777 0
MOF6 0.0457 0
MOF8 0.0737 0
MOF9 0.1550 0
MOFO1 0.0343 0
MOF11 0.1193 0
MOF12 0.0640 0
MOF13 0.0480 0
MOF14 0.0447 0
MOF16 0.1577 0
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HEP9: Check reading with limits
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.259, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.0027 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0257 0
MOF2 0.1047 0
MOF3 0.1357 0
MOF4 0.0397 0
MOF5 0.0337 0
MOF6 0.1427 0
MOF8 0.0583 0
MOF9 0.0720 0
MOF10 0.0147 0
MOF11 0.0530 0
MOF12 0.0257 0
MOF13 0.0553 0
MOF14 0.0423 0
MOF16 0.1967 0
Modified HEP9: 0.0003
HEP10: Nonpassive task error of commission
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.25, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.008 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF2 0.2427 0
MOF3 0.1087 0
MOF5 0.0183 0
MOF6 0.0523 0
MOF8 0.0893 0
MOF9 0.0400 0
MOF11 0.0667 0
MOF12 0.0293 0
MOF13 0.1427 0
MOF14 0.0757 0
MOF16 0.1350 0
Modified HEP10: 0.0010
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HEP11: Recalling two instructions given orally
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.25, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.008 [Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF2 0.2047 0
MOF3 0.1070 0
MOF5 0.0070 0
MOF6 0.1683 0
MOF8 0.1333 0
MOF9 0.0890 0
MOF11 0.0253 0
MOF12 0.0113 0
MOF13 0.0920 0
MOF14 0.0220 0
MOF16 0.1407 0
Modified HEP11: 0.0010
HEP12: Diagnosis - Dropping anchor
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.2105, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.95 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.01586 0.00
MOF2 0.1604 0.00
MOF3 0.0634 0.00
MOF4 0.1530 0.00
MOF5 0.0320 0.00
MOF6 0.1456 0.00
MOF8 0.0592 0.00
MOF9 0.0346 0.00
MOF11 0.0412 0.00
MOF12 0.0208 0.00
MOF13 0.1061 0.00
MOF14 0.0504 0.00
MOF15 0.0616 0.00
MOF16 0.0557 0.00
Modified HEP12: 0.0500
Note: The ranking values are changed in order to remove the factor regarding the
natural environment from the equation
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HEP13: Diagnosis - Requesting assistance
Inadequate = 1, Adequate = 0.2105, Excellent = 0
Uncertainty: 0.95 Weight
Ranking Rating value (RankingxRatingValue)
MOF1 0.0138 0
MOF2 0.1992 0
MOF3 0.0865 0
MOF4 0.1399 0
MOF5 0.0272 0
MOF6 0.1323 0
MOF8 0.0489 0
MOF9 0.0186 0
MOF11 0.0227 0
MOF12 0.0103 0
MOF13 0.1099 0
MOF14 0.0538 0
MOF15 0.0524 0
MOF16 0.0845 0
Note: The ranking values are changed in order to remove the factor regarding the
natural environment from the equation
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Appendix IX
Probability of Grounding - Company for which all MOFs are rated excellent
P(ProducingFaultyPlan): 0.0037277
P(ErrorsMadeInPlanning): 5.2188E-09
P(PlannedTrackUnsafe): 9.1601E-07
P(FixNotCorrect):
P(DifferenceErrorNotDetectedByMeasurement):
P(DifferenceErrorNotDetectedVisually):
P(DifferenceErrorNotDetected):
P(InsufficientAction):
P(PilotingError):
E(PilotingErrorRate):
P(CourseDeviatesFromPlan-StraightTrack):
P(NoFix-LeftTurn):
P(NoFix-RightTum):
P(CourseDeviatesFromPlanInTurn):
P(CourseDeviatesFromSafeDesiredTrack):
P(AdverseEnvironmentalConditions):
P(LostWay):
P(AnchorFailure):
P(AssistanceFailure):
P(PoweredGrounding):
P(DriftGrounding):
IP(Grounding):
3.10000E-06
0.0000037
0.75
2.775E-06
0.000004
6.775E-06
2.2583E-06
3.6452E-07
0.95605591
0.87387611
1.098E-05
5.672E-06
0.25
0.000324
0.0500
0.0500
6.5880E-06
2.0250E-07
0.000006791
Sensitivity Analysis
Percent change compared to company for which all MOFs are rated:
Powered
Inadequate
Adequate -
Excellent -
Drift
-99.54
-93.29
0.00
Grounding
-99.75 -99.55
-96.00 -93.44
0.00 0.00
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